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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, mobile app developers are enjoying the benefits of the amalgamation of web and
mobile platforms. Developers can easily and smoothly integrate all sorts of web services in their
mobile apps by embedding a browser-like UI component, called “WebView”, which can render web
content and run JavaScript code within mobile apps (call hybrid apps for convenience). WebView is
easy to use and popular. A recent study showed ~80% of Android apps used WebView. WebView is
also as powerful as regular browsers (e.g., Chrome/Chromium), and well supports web features and
behaviors.
In regular browsers, there exist several sensitive web behaviors that are often the root reason of
critical security issues. In past years, they have been well studied, and a variety of mature defense
solutions have been deployed. However, these sensitive web behaviors are seldom understood and
scrutinized in WebView, which provides a totally new working environment. Different from regular
browsers, WebView offers mobile developers freedom to customize their WebView instances by
enabling several unique programming features. For example, WebView allows mobile code to
control and customize web behaviors through WebView setting and event handler APIs. Considering
these WebView features may heavily impact above sensitive web behaviors, it is unclear whether
the corresponding defense solutions are still effective in WebView.
Motivated by above security concerns, in this dissertation, we conduct the systematic security
study of several sensitive web behaviors (e.g., web events, web messaging, and the utilization of
iframes and popups) in WebView of the Android platform, which is open and the biggest mobile
operating system (OS). As a consequence, we discover several novel security vulnerabilities and
fundamental design flaws. To demonstrate the security implications, we devise several concrete
attacks. Through these attacks, untrusted code (e.g., ads) loaded in WebView can open holes on
existing defense solutions, and obtain risky privileges and abilities, such as stealing users’ private
data (e.g., GPS location), unauthorizedly accessing sensitive hardware (e.g., microphone), and
performing phishing attacks. Then, we study and assess the security impacts of these security issues
on real-world hybrid apps. For this purpose, we develop novel tools that can automatically apply
program analysis techniques to vet Android apps. By analyzing a large number of most popular apps
ii
collected from the official Android marketplace, we find the vulnerabilities are prevalent. Many
high-profile apps are verified to be impacted, such as Facebook, Instagram, Facebook Messenger,
Google News, Skype, Uber, Yelp, and U.S. Bank. To mitigate these security issues from the root,
we design multi-level defense solutions that enhance the security of WebView. Our evaluation on
real-world apps shows our mitigation solutions are effective and scalable, with negligible overhead.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Nowadays, mobile app developers are enjoying the benefits of the amalgamation of web and
mobile platforms. Developers can easily and smoothly integrate all sorts of web services in their
mobile apps by embedding a browser-like UI component, called “WebView” [1], which can render
web content and run JavaScript code within mobile apps. WebView is easy to use and popular. A
recent study [2] showed ~80% of Android apps used WebView. WebView is also as powerful as
regular browsers (e.g., Chrome/Chromium), and well supports web features and behaviors. Thus,
through WebView, developers can also easily and smoothly re-use existing web code in their apps.
For convenience, in this dissertation, we refer to these WebView-enabled mobile apps as hybrid
apps.
In the context of regular browsers, there exist several sensitive web behaviors that are often
the root reason of critical security issues (e.g., frame hijacking [3] and clickjacking [4, 5]). In past
years, they have been well studied, and a variety of mature defense solutions have been deployed,
such as Same Origin Policy (SOP) [6], HTML5 iframe sandbox [7], and navigation policies [3].
However, these sensitive web behaviors are seldom understood and scrutinized in the context of
WebView, which provides a totally new working environment. Different from regular browsers,
WebView offers mobile developers freedom to customize their WebView instances by enabling
several unique UI and programming features. For example, as shown in Figure 1.1, WebView
enables web/mobile (cross-platform) bridges that link web and mobile layers. Through the event
handler bridge, mobile code can control and handle web events (e.g., link clicking). WebView also
provides the setting APIs for developers to configure their WebView instances (e.g., disabling the
execution of JavaScript code). Considering the customization of WebView instances may heavily
impact sensitive web behaviors, it is unclear whether the corresponding defense solutions are still
effective in such a new context of WebView. In this dissertation, we use the term “context” to refer
to a web environment that includes GUI elements (e.g., the address and tab bars), corresponding
web/mobile APIs (e.g., the setting APIs in WebView), and security defense solutions (e.g., SOP and
navigation policies).
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Table 1.1: Summary of Novel Vulnerabilities
Critical Behaviors
Contexts
Attacks Consequences
Browsers WebView
Web Events
Browsers and
web code
Mobile code
Event-Oriented
Exploits, EOE
(Chapter 3)
Sensitive information
leakage, phishing
attacks, and so on
postMessage
Regular (safe)
postMessage
Hybrid
postMessage
Origin Stripping
Vulnerabilities, OSV
(Chapter 4)
Stealthily accessing
hardware, DoS, and
so on
Iframes/popups Complete UI
Incomplete UI
and conflicted
programming
APIs
Differential Context
Vulnerabilities, DCV
(Chapter 5)
Phishing attacks, and
so on
Motivated by above security concerns, in this dissertation, we conduct the systematic security
study of several sensitive web behaviors in the WebView context of the Android platform, which is
open and the biggest mobile OS. These target web behaviors include:
• web events: URL clicking and navigation, alert events and so on
• web messaging (i.e., postMessage [8]): relaxing SOP and allowing the communication
between different web frames
• the utilization of iframes and popups: creating and closing iframes/popups
As a consequence, we discover several novel security vulnerabilities and fundamental design flaws
(summarized in Table 1.1). To demonstrate the security implications, we devise several concrete
attacks. We find when there is untrusted code (e.g., ads) loaded in WebView, which is very common
in practice, the untrusted code can launch these attacks to open holes on existing defense solutions,
and obtain risky privileges and abilities, such as stealing users’ private data (e.g., GPS location),
unauthorizedly accessing sensitive hardware (e.g., microphone), and performing phishing attacks.
Then, we study and assess the security impacts of these security issues on real-world hybrid apps.
For this purpose, we develop novel tools that can automatically apply program analysis techniques
to vet Android apps. By analyzing a large number of most popular apps collected from the official
Android marketplace, we find the vulnerabilities are prevalent. Many high-profile apps are verified
to be impacted, such as Facebook, Instagram, Facebook Messenger, Google News, Skype, Uber,
Yelp, and U.S. Bank. To mitigate these security issues from the root, we design multi-level defense
2

untrusted code (e.g., third-party tracking code) in the web layer, the untrusted code can trigger
web events in the web layer, further call event handler in the mobile layers, and finally access the
sensitive functionalities inside event handlers. In this dissertation, we refer to this type of attacks as
Event-Oriented Exploits (EOEs).
Our study shows the EOE issue causes serious consequences, such as sensitive information
leakage, and cross-frame manipulation. What is worse is EOE based attacks cannot be defended
against by all existing defense solutions (e.g., [9] [10]). To further evaluate the security impacts of
the EOE issue, we design a novel vulnerability detection tool, called EOEDroid, that applies the
selective symbolic execution technique to vet Android apps. By applying EOEDroid on real-world
apps, we find 97 total vulnerabilities in 58 apps. Base on our study results, we explore potential
defense solutions.
1.3 postMessage
WebView inherits the defense solutions from regular browsers, including SOP. However, SOP
also introduces side effects: it does not allow the communication between different distrusted web
frames. In HTML5, this problem is mitigated by the postMessage mechanism and its corresponding
security model.
WebView also supports the postMessage mechanism. However, we find in hybrid apps, postMes-
sage does not meet app developers’ requirements. Developers does want the communication not
only between different web frames, but also between web frames and the mobile layer. To mitigate
the problem, we find developers extend existing postMessage (i.e., regular postMessage) as a new
communication channel between the web and mobile layers. However, due to the strong isolation
between the web and mobile layers, the extended postMessage (i.e., hybrid postMessage) cannot
follow the security model designed for regular postMessage. In particular, all origin information
(e.g., the message sender and receiver) of messages sent through hybrid postMessage is lost. Thus,
any web code loaded in WebView can freely accept the message sent by the mobile layer without any
limitation or origin validation. If the message contains sensitive information, serious consequences
may be caused. In this dissertation, we refer to the security issues as Origin Stripping Vulnerabilities
(OSVs).
To evaluate the prevalence and presence of hybrid postMessage and OSVs in Android hybrid
4
apps, we design a lightweight detection tool, called OSV-Hunter, that can help developers and
analysts identify hybrid postMessage and discover potential OSVs. Our analysis on real-world apps
shows 74 apps implement hybrid postMessage, and all these apps suffer from OSV, which may be
exploited by remote attackers to perform denial of service (DoS), local critical hardware device
access (such as real-time microphone monitoring), data race, internal data manipulation, and so on.
To mitigate the OSV issue, we design and implement a set of new hybrid postMessage APIs in
the newest WebView, called OSV-Free. Our evaluation shows that OSV-Free is secure and fast, and
it is generic and resilient to the notorious Android fragmentation problem. We also demonstrate that
OSV-Free is easy to use. OSV-Free is open source, and its source code and more implementation
and evaluation details are available online: http://success.cse.tamu.edu/lab/osv-free.
php.
1.4 Iframes/Popups
Iframes/popups are frequently used by web code, for example, to show different formats of files
(e.g., video and pictures), and load untrusted content (e.g., ads). Our study shows iframes/popups,
which are well studied and protected in regular browsers, are dangerous in WebView. Different
from other web behaviors (e.g., web events and postMessage), iframes/popups are impacted not
only by WebView’s programming features (e.g., web/mobile bridges), but also by WebView UI
features. More specifically, different from regular browsers, who have complete UI components
(e.g., address, status, and title bars), WebView UI is designed in a simple style. Only one area for
rendering web content is included in WebView. Hence, if there is an iframe/popup (i.e., untrusted
iframe/popup) that carries untrusted content inside WebView, and the untrusted iframe/popup can
navigate the main or top frame of WebView, phishing attacks occur.
Our systematic study on Android WebView uncovers a novel class of vulnerabilities (referred
to as Differential Context Vulnerabilities or DCV) and design flaws associated with iframe/popup
behaviors in WebView. To assess their security impacts on real-world apps, we develop a novel
vulnerability detection tool, called DCV-Hunter, for automatically vetting given apps against DCV.
Then, by applying DCV-Hunter on a number of most popular apps, we show that DCV are prevalent.
More specifically, we find 30.4% of 11,341 hybrid apps are potentially vulnerable, including 9,770
potentially vulnerable WebView instances and 18,459 potential vulnerabilities. Up to now, the
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potentially impacted apps have been downloaded more than 23 billion times in total. Furthermore,
our evaluation shows DCV-Hunter is scalable and effective, and has relatively low false positives. To
mitigate DCV, we propose a multi-level protection solution by enhancing the security of WebView
programming and UI features. Our evaluation on real-world apps shows that our solution is effective
and scalable, and introduces negligible overhead.
1.5 Dissertation Contributions and Organization
In this dissertation, our contributions include:
• We conduct the systematic security study on several sensitive web behaviors in the context of
WebView, and discover several novel security issues and design flaws in Android WebView.
• To demonstrate their security impacts, we devise several novel possible attacks. We find
all of these attacks cannot be prevented by existing defense solutions, and cause serious
consequences. We show by leveraging these attacks, remote attackers can make several
nefarious actions, including stealing users’ private data (e.g., GPS), unauthorizedly accessing
sensitive hardware (e.g., microphone), and performing phishing attacks.
• We develop novel vulnerability detection approaches, and apply them on a large number of
real-world popular apps to assess the security impacts of these security issues. We find these
issues are prevalent, and impact many high-profile apps, such as Facebook and Instagram.
• To mitigate the new problems from the root, we design and implement several novel and
effective protection solutions.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we first introduce
necessary background information. Next, we present three security issues in Android WebView
with their assessment and mitigation in Chapter 3-5. Then, we discuss related work in Chapter 6
and lessons learned and best WebView integrity practice in Chapter 7. Finally, we conclude the
dissertation in Chapter 8.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Android
Android apps are typically written in Java and compiled to Dalvik bytecode [11]. At runtime,
bytecodes are interpreted and executed by Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) [12]. Generally, an
app consists of four components: activity (i.e., the user interface), background service, content
providers (i.e., database), and Android native event receivers. Intent can be used in interactions
among components and apps.
2.2 WebView
WebView is an embedded UI component used to render web pages and run JavaScript code
within mobile apps. Android WebView is equipped with the newest kernel of the regular browser
“Chrome/Chromium”, and performs as powerful as regular browsers. WebView is customizable. As
shown in Figure 1.1, WebView provide several APIs to let developers customize their WebView
instances. In particular, developers can configure WebView through the settings APIs, such as
enabling JavaScript, and the access of local files, database, and GPS location. Developers can also
use the content loading APIs (e.g., loadUrl()) to load web content into their WebView instances.
Developers can also leverage web/mobile bridges to enable the interactions between web and mobile
layers. Web/mobile bridges mainly have two formats: JavaScript bridges and event handlers. More
details are presented below.
WebView allows JavaScript Bridge, which provides a channel linking web code with native
code. More specifically, apps can run the API “addJavascriptInterface(O, N )” to import a Java
object O to the JavaScript context. Then, O can be directly accessed by JavaScript code using its
name N .
However, WebView does not provide any access control on JavaScript Bridge. Any JavaScript
code loaded in WebView can easily access it without any limitations. This has been well studied
by existing work [9] [10] [13]. Several defense solutions [9, 10, 14–17] were proposed to enhance
the security of WebView by providing the security enforcement and access control mechanisms.
However, we find they are ineffective against our new attacks.
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2.3 Event Handlers
WebView can specify event handlers to handle web events that occur in WebView. The event
handler feature makes WebView more powerful. Usually, the function prototypes of event handlers
are pre-defined by the Android system in the native (i.e., Java in Android) language. Hence, to
implement an event handler, developers need to override the corresponding Java function, and then
register the implementation in WebView. When the corresponding event is triggered in the web
context, the event handler implemented by developers is called to handle it. For instance, developers
can override the event handler shouldOverrideUrlLoading() to handle the URL navigation event.
If an event handler is not implemented by developers, the default implementation in the Android
system will be called.
WebView manages event handlers by either itself or event handler classes. An event handler
class is a collection of event handlers. There are mainly two types of event handler classes. One is
WebViewClient, which manages the event handlers that are relevant to URL navigation. The other
is WebChromeClient, which manages the event handlers that are relevant to UI display, such as
handling the alert dialog opened by JavaScript alert().
2.4 Iframes/Popups and Related Protection
Iframes/popups are frequently used in web apps, for example, to view files in various formats
(e.g., images, videos and PDFs) or load third-party untrusted web content such as ads. They are
easy to use. To create an iframe, developers can 1) either use the HTML element <iframe>; 2) or
run JavaScript code to dynamically build an iframe DOM node.
Furthermore, to enable a popup, developers can use the following HTML code to generate a
link:
<a href="URL" target="_blank|_top|frame_name|...".
When users click the link, “URL” will be opened in the frame that is determined by the “target”
attribute. If target is “_blank”, a new popup window will be opened to show “URL”. Moreover, if
target is “_top” or a specific frame name, “URL” will be loaded in the main frame or the specific
frame determined by “frame_name”. Developers can also use JavaScript code to open or close a
web window:
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window.open(URL, <target>, ...) or window.close().
Similar to the usage of the HTML element <a>, “window.open()” can also determine where to open
popup content.
Up to now, several practical protection solutions were designed and deployed in regular browsers,
including:
• Same origin policy (SOP): SOP isolates web frames whose origins are different. Note that SOP
causes side effects that different origins are not allowed to communicate with each other. It is
mitigated by the postMessage mechanism.
• Browser built-in security policies: Several built-in policies are available. For example, remote
web code is not allowed to create a new sub-frame for loading local files, and the main frame is
not allowed to load the data scheme URL.
• HTML5 iframe sandbox: The iframe sandbox mechanism can limit iframes’ abilities, mainly
including the enablement of JavaScript, main-frame navigation (“<a>” or “window.open()”), and
popup-creation. Since the security of the popup behavior is one of our research objectives, we
assume the popup-creation ability is allowed in iframe sandbox. Thus, in this paper, we mainly
consider the abilities related to JavaScript enablement and main-frame navigation.
• Navigation policies: As studied in existing work [3], in regular browsers, the main frame is often
exempt from strict navigation policies, which means any sub-frame can directly navigate the main
frame by using “<a>” or “window.open()”. There are several reasons for such a design. First, this
type of navigation is frequently used by benign web apps, for example, for preventing framing
attacks [4]. Second, even though the main frame is navigated, the consequence is quite limited in
consideration of the stealthiness: any navigation can be explicitly reflected by URL indicators
(e.g., the URL address bar).
2.5 Inconsistencies Between Regular Browsers and WebView
As discussed in Section 1.4, there are several inconsistencies between regular browsers and
WebView. First, WebView UI is like a small and compacted version of a regular browser. It does
not contain several common UI elements, including the address, tab, title and status bars.
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Second, WebView UI is a case of view group, a collection of multiple Android UI components.
More than that, it can also be added to an existing view group. A view group may consist of a set of
WUIs with the same size. It manages multiple WUIs with a rendering queue, and only rendering
the foremost WUI to users.
Third, the manners of initializing web content are different. Compared to regular browsers,
which allow users to manually type the address of a website, WebView initializes web content
through programming APIs (Figure 1.1), including:
• loadUrl(URL/file/JS): loading content in the main frame; Through the API loadUrl(), WebView
renders content in its UI component. The parameter format supported by loadUrl() is diverse.
It can be a URL, a local HTML file, or JavaScript code. If the parameter is JavaScript code, 1)
it must start with the special string “javascript:”, and 2) it is executed in the main web frame.
For instance, the following code will popup an alert window to show current cookie in the main
frame:
WebView.loadUrl("javascript:alert(document.cookie);").
• loadData(HTML, ...): loading code with the “null” origin;
• loadDataWithBaseURL(origin,HTML,...): loading HTML code with a specified origin.
The last two APIs are often used to load web content from local storage.
Last, as shown in Figure 1.1, developers can customize a WebView instance through several
programming features, such as settings, and web-mobile bridges. Settings can manage WebView
configurations, while Web-mobile bridges can link the web and mobile layers together. Generally,
the bridges include 1) event handlers, which can handle web events that occur inside WebView; and
2) JavaScript bridges, which can allow JavaScript code to directly access native methods.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 2.1, several programming features can impact iframe/popup
behaviors. To enable the creation of a popup, the settings SupportMultipleWindows should be set as
true, and the event handler onCreateWindow() is also required to be implemented and return true.
This event handler should create or open a WUI for rendering this popup, and also return the WUI
to Android. Otherwise, the popup-creation operation will be ignored. This also means that different
popup windows are rendered by different WUIs at one time. Besides, to support the closure of a
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WUI, the event handler onCloseWindow() should be also implemented. Note that when any web
frame, including the main frame, load content, the content should be approved by the event handler
“shouldOverrideUrlLoading()”.
Table 2.1: Iframe/Popup-Related Programming Features
Features Content Explanation
Settings
OpenWindowsAutomatically Enable “window.open()”
SupportMultipleWindows
Enable the event handler
“onCreateWindow()”
Event
Handlers
onCreateWindow() Handle window-creation
onCloseWindow() Handle window-closure
shouldOverrideUrlLoading() Handle URL-loading
2.6 postMessage and Hybrid postMessage
1 // Send a message
2 window.postMessage(m, t)
3
4 // Enable the first message handler
5 function message_handler(e) { ... }
6 window.addEventListener("message", message_handler, false)
7
8 // Enable the second message handler
9 onmessage = function (e) { ... }
Listing 2.1: Usage of postMessage
postMessage. postMessage is frequently used to exchange data between different origins in
HTML5-enabled web applications. Listing 2.1 presents the basic usage of postMessage. In Line 2,
window.postMessage() is called to send the message content m to the target origin t. From Line
4 to Line 9, two message handlers are enabled in two different manners : 1) calling the method
addEventListener() to register the message handler ‘message_handler()’ (Line 6); 2) or rewriting
the global object onmessage to enable an anonymous message handler (Line 9). Please note that
when a message arrives, both these two message handlers will be called to handle it.
When a message handler is called, the parameter e carries all required information, such as the
message content ‘e.data’, the message source origin ‘e.origin’, and the message sender’s window
reference ‘e.source’. Please note that ‘e.source’ may also be used to identify the message sender.
However, in this paper, we mainly focus on ‘e.origin’.
11
The message handler (receiver) is responsible for validating the source origin to ensure the
message is from a trusted origin. This requirement is deferred to the message handler implementation
and not enforced by the OS or framework. The absence of such validation will cause the client-side
validation vulnerability (i.e., CSV), which is well studied by existing work [18–20].
The Official Hybrid postMessage APIs in WebView. In Android 6.0, cross-document APIs (such
as “WebView.postWebMessage()”) and channel messaging APIs (such as ‘‘WebView.createW
ebMessageChannel()’’) [21] are added. However, both suffer from the Android fragmentation
problem [22]. Based on the new Android version distribution data [23] (Nov. 2017), almost 42% of
Android devices do not support these official APIs. Furthermore, compared with “postWebMes-
sage()”, “createWebMessageChannel()” can allow bidirectional communication. However, in our
empirical study, we found channel messaging was heavy, and rarely implemented and used in hybrid
postMessage.
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3. STUDYING AND PROTECTING WEB EVENTS*
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 Motivation
There are several potential ways for untrusted code loaded in WebView to leverage the event
handler bridge (Figure 3.1). In the first attack scenario, web/mobile bridges may be directly utilized
to access the sensitive functionalities behind these bridges by untrusted web code. Prior work
(e.g., [24] [2] [25] [26] [27] [28]) has well studied JavaScript Bridge (Figure 1.1), a format of
web/mobile bridges that directly allow web code to call mobile code (e.g., Java code for Android).
However, we find another type of web/mobile bridges (named “Event Handler”), which allow event
handlers pre-defined and registered in the native (or mobile) layer (e.g., Java in Android) to handle
web events that occur in WebView, are rarely studied.
3.1.2 Security Issues
We find the utilization of event handler bridges in attack vectors is much more complicated and
difficult, compared to JavaScript bridges. There are two main potential attack scenarios based on the
event handler features. A possible attack scenario is that an adversary may trigger an event handler
with appropriate input to leverage its internal critical functionalities. More details are shown in
Figure 3.1. First, the adversary injects malicious HTML/JavaScript code into WebView through
web or network attacks (Step 1). Then, the malicious code is executed and triggers a web event
(Step 2). After that, the corresponding event handler in the native code is called (Step 3). Finally,
the event handler is guided by the injected input to execute its internal critical functionalities (Step
4).
The above possibility is confirmed by our small-scale empirical study of a small set of popular
hybrid apps. We found that an event handler in an old but still popular advertisement (ad) library,
“millennialmedia” (version 5), contains rich and powerful functionalities, such as reading Android
ID, recording audio and opening the camera. However, the access control on that event handler is
* Part of this chapter is reprinted with the permission from “Automated Generation of Event-Oriented Exploits in
Android Hybrid Apps”, GuangLiang Yang, Jeff Huang, and Guofei Gu. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed
Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 2018, Copyright c© 2018 by Internet Society.
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Figure 3.1: Event-Oriented Exploits
weak. The internal critical functionalities can be utilized by triggering the associated web event and
feeding it with appropriate input that follows the format “mmsdk://c1.c2?args=...&callbac
k=...”, where c1 and c2 are the native functions to be accessed, args are the function’s parameters
and callback is a JavaScript function name to receive the execution result of the native function.
In addition to the above scenario, another potential attack scenario is that a path to a critical
functionality inside an event handler may be executed only under a specific program state, but such
state may not be simply reached by only feeding that event handler with arbitrary input. Instead,
similar to return oriented programming based attacks [29], it is possible for adversaries to play
web events as “gadgets” and change an app’s state. Assume the target program state is St. It may
be reached through the transitions [S1→S2→ ... →St], which could be achieved by triggering the
sequence of web events [E1→E2→ ... →Et−1]. Hence, by following the above web event chain,
adversaries can still change the program state to St and execute the target critical functionality.
We generalize all above attacks as Event-Oriented Exploit (EOE). Due to EOE’s powerful
capabilities to access critical functionalities through event handlers, serious consequences may
be caused, such as local resource access, users’ private data leakage and web cross-frame DOM
manipulation.
Compared with existing attacks on Android (such as Trojan Attack [30]), EOE has multiple
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advantages. First, EOE does not require any extra permissions. The malicious web code injected
by adversaries fully inherits the target apps’ permissions. Second, EOE does not require malicious
payloads. Instead, the functionalities contained in event handlers are utilized.
Furthermore, compared with existing attacks on WebView (such as sidewinder targeted attack
[31], fracking attack [9], and code injection attack [32]), EOE is more practical and feasible.
Existing attacks usually require JavaScript and JavaScript-bridge to be enabled, but EOE has no
such requirements (Section 3.4.1). Even only through HTML code and special HTTP(s) responses,
adversaries can still trigger and leverage many event handlers, including the popular event handlers
shouldOverrideUrlLoading(), which handles the URL navigation event.
The impact of EOE to smartphone security is serious considering the pervasive deployment
of hybrid apps today. However, exiting techniques face significant challenges in detecting and
verifying apps against EOE. Static analysis suffers from high false positives due to the lack of
real data and context. In addition, the limitation of static analysis for handling Java reflection is
exacerbated when the reflection operation is combined with array-indexing type implicit flows,
which occur frequently when parsing the gadgets’ inputs. Dynamic analysis may have low false
positives, but is prone to low code coverage. Moreover, generating the required sequence of gadgets
to reveal an EOE vulnerability is inherently challenging.
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Figure 3.2: The Design of EOEDroid.
3.1.3 Vulnerability Detection
The design of EOEDroid is depicted in Figure 3.2. Given a target app, EOEDroid first employs
selective symbolic execution to analyze all its event handlers, actively explore all interesting paths
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and identify critical functionalities. The path constraints of each interesting path are collected
for further analysis. A significant difference with existing symbolic execution based techniques
is that EOEDroid carefully handles all conditional statements, including those whose associated
operands are not symbolic (i.e., concrete or constant). This is because those conditional statements
can provide hints to generate gadgets’ execution orders.
To mitigate the notorious “path explosion” problem in symbolic execution, we use several
heuristics (e.g., scanning “interesting” APIs and instructions to discover interesting paths in Section
3.4.2.1). While these heuristics might cause over-approximation and/or inaccuracy to our analysis,
they help us make a good tradeoff between performance and accuracy. In addition, we propose
new solutions to address the analysis challenges raised by array-indexing type implicit flows as
well as Android features and specifications such as unsupported fork() [33] and inter-component
communication (e.g., Android Intent).
Based on the results of selective symbolic execution, EOEDroid then applies static analysis to
discover program states that can lead to the execution of a critical functionality, and generates input
and execution order of event handlers to reach the program state. The input of an event handler
can be generated by solving its path constraints, and the execution order of event handlers can
be constructed by solving the event handler dependency problem on those conditional statements
whose operands are not symbolic.
Finally, EOEDroid generates exploit code by converting event handlers’ input and execution
orders to gadgets’ (i.e., web events). If JavaScript code is required as gadgets’ input, EOEDroid is
also aware of its syntax and generates the required code.
Along with this, we conduct a systematic study of events, event handlers, and their triggering
code and constraints in WebView. We find that 37 web events are exposed to adversaries, and the
constraints on triggering events and event handlers are mainly caused by the status of JavaScript and
the level of the web frame the malicious code is injected into. We also find that five event handlers
have extra trigger constraints caused by predetermined execution orders of event handlers, and we
identify 29 channels that can pass data from web code to native code.
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3.1.4 Evaluation
We have implemented EOEDroid based on the Android framework and the Dalvik virtual
machine (DVM), and evaluated it with 3,652 most popular apps collected from Google Play.
EOEDroid found 97 total vulnerabilities in 58 apps, including 2 cross-frame DOM manipulation,
53 phishing, 30 sensitive information leakage, 1 local resources access, and 11 Intent abuse
vulnerabilities. We also found a potential backdoor in a high-profile app that may be used by
adversaries to steal users’ sensitive information, such as IMEI. Even though the developers of the
app attempted to close the backdoor, EOEDroid found that adversaries were still able to exploit
it by triggering two events together and feeding event handlers with appropriate inputs. We show
more details in our case study in Section 3.5.3.2 to illustrate this vulnerability.
3.2 Problem Statement
3.2.1 Motivating Example
To illustrate event-oriented exploits, we walk through a real-world vulnerable app with relevant
code shown in Figure 3.3. In the activity “WebViewActivity”, the app initializes a webview compo-
nent by a class “MyClient”, which implements an event handler “shouldOverrideUrlLoading()”.
In the event handler, the input url is firstly parsed by a class “URI”, which is commonly used to
analyze URI’s syntax and extract useful information, such as URI’s scheme and host. Then, the
url’s content is analyzed, which determines the event handler’s behaviors. If the url’s scheme is
“market”, “tel”, or “sms”, the corresponding external apps (such as Google Play, default phone
call app, or default text message app) will be opened to handle the input (Path1). If the url’s host
is “developer.com” (which means WebView connects to a remote server), the event handler may
approve the connection (Path2).
Meanwhile, the event handler implements supports for the customized scheme “sdk”. If the url’s
host h is “init”, WebView executes JavaScript code to perform initialization (Path3). If h’s format
is “c0.c1.c2”, the app calls the Java method whose class name is determined by c0, method name
c1, and execution result is transferred to the JavaScript method c3 (Path4). Note that resolving the
Java method relies on the content of the variable “hashmap”, which converts c0 (i.e., commands[0])
to the real class name (i.e., className). Such an operation introduces an implicit flow from c0 to
className. “Class2” is one of classes whose methods can be invoked by the event handler. In its
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method getId(), the device ID is transferred to the web space. In its method login(), the activity
“LoginActivity” is started through an Intent message to ask users to login. In the Intent message, part
of the url’s content (i.e., c2) is contained and passed to the message receiver.
Note that in the example app there is a critical function: getDeviceId() in the method getId() of
Class2. Adversaries cannot directly utilize this functionality, because the operand tmpbool is false
(i.e., the conditional statement C6). However, by manipulating gadgets, adversaries may change the
program state (such as tmpbool’s value) and drive the app to call getId(). In getId() a JavaScript
function is also required as part of the event handler’s input to receive the device ID.
Although it appears simple to manually analyze this example code, real-world apps are much
more complex. Our goal is to develop a technique that can automatically detect such vulnerabilities
and construct exploit code.
Figure 3.3: Vulnerable Code from a Real-World App
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3.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that WebView is enabled in apps, but JavaScript is not required to be enabled,
since HTML code can also trigger event handlers. We assume that adversaries can inject malicious
HTML/JavaScript code into WebView. As Figure 3.1 shows, we consider the following two different
attack scenarios:
• Web Attack: In this scenario, we assume adversaries control several malicious domains and
servers, but they are not able to control or monitor the network traffic between apps and other
domains.
The web content loaded from first-parties is trustable. However, the content may further
contain subframes (e.g., iframe) to load extra web content from third-parties, which may be
malicious.
Generally, all web frames loaded in WebView are well isolated and protected by same origin
policy (SOP) [6].
• Network Attack: Adversaries can hijack unsafe network traffic (such as HTTP) through
man-in-the-middle attacks. Compared with desktop programs, mobile apps are more likely to
suffer from this type of attacks, considering that many unsafe WI-FI hotspots are used [34].
Note that we do not assume any other abilities of the adversaries. They may not access the users’
device, install any certificate or malware, or change apps’ internal data. The target app itself as well
as all the apps pre-installed on the users’ devices may be benign.
3.2.3 Security Issues
Similar to other attacks on WebView [9], the security issues caused by event handlers are rooted
in the inconsistency of security models between web and native context. In hybrid apps, the SOP
security model for the web context is circumscribed to prevent event handlers from being triggered
by malicious web code, because the handlers do not have any way of identifying the origin of
an event (so they have no way to distinguish between trusted and untrusted origins). SOP is also
ineffective to protect the local resources (such as camera), which are located in the native context.
The permission based sandbox model for the native context can protect local resources. However,
19
it is ineffective to prevent the access to critical functionalities from web code, since the origin
information of the access is lost.
3.2.4 Problem Definition
We state that an exploit is successful if it successfully triggers a critical functionality through
event handlers defined in the app. A successful exploit must satisfy the constraints in triggering
target events and event handlers: it must guide the target app to reach the target state by manipulating
the input and execution orders of gadgets, and it must bypass all security checks which are usually
located before the critical functionality.
The event-oriented exploit generation problem can be formally defined as follows. Given an
app, discover a program state s that leads the app to execute a critical functionality. Such a state
should be reached through a sequence of executions of gadgets ((W0, E0, I0, J0), (W1, E1, I1, J1),
. . . , (Wn, En, In, J0)), whereWi is the HTML/JavaScript code that triggers the event Ei and passes
the input Ii to Ei. Ii may also include pre-defined JavaScript code Ji.
3.2.5 Critical Functionalities
We define critical functionalities as sensitive APIs in the Android framework. In this dissertation,
we mainly consider the following four types of APIs. Nevertheless, EOEDroid is extensible and
user customized APIs can be added easily.
3.2.5.1 URL Loading API
If malicious HTML/JavaScript code in subframes leverages the URL loading API (e.g., We-
bView.loadUrl(p)) through EOE, the content of the main frame or the whole WebView may be
changed. Depending on the value of the API parameter p, the following two consequences may be
caused:
• Cross-Frame DOM Manipulation: If the web code in subframes influences p’s value and
makes p be starting with “javascript:”, the JavaScript code contained in p may be executed in
the main frame. Hence, through EOE, the web code in subframes obtains the capability to
bypass SOP and inject malicious code to the main frame.
• Phishing: If the web code in subframes can determines p’s value through EOE, it may change
p’s value to the url of a fake web page. Then, WebView is redirected to show the fake web
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page. Considering that WebView usually does not have an address bar to indicate the url it is
loading, such attacks on WebView are much more stealthy than on regular web browsers.
Compared with other attack channels (such as MITM attacks) which may also be utilized
to perform above attacks, EOE over loadUrl() is more powerful. Considering the situation that
WebView loads a webpage from developers’ web site using HTTPS, and one of its nested subframes
uses HTTP. Due to boundaries between frames, existing attacks may only be able to control the
content of the subframe, but not the main frame. However, EOE does not have this limitation. By
means of loadUrl(), adversaries can directly change the content of the main frame.
3.2.5.2 Source and Sink APIs
This type of API invocations may result in users’ privacy leakage. We mainly consider two
scenarios: (1) there are paths from source to sink in event handlers. (2) source is passed to the web
space, and then sent out through HTML/JavaScript code.
We consider the Android ID, device ID, phone number, and serial number, and GPS location
information as source, and connecting network and sending text message as sink.
3.2.5.3 APIs Accessing Local Resources
This type of APIs may be leveraged by adversaries to access local resources, such as local files,
and hardware resource (e.g., camera). Serious consequences may be caused when these APIs are
combined with other sensitive APIs. For instance, adversaries may remotely take a picture and
also save it to the local storage using camera APIs. Then, adversaries may obtain the picture in the
web context through file reading API and further send the picture out through native sink APIs or
HTML/JavaScript code.
3.2.5.4 APIs Sending Intent messages
As demonstrated by Wang et al. [14], the Intent messages that are sent out through WebView
may have serious consequences. We consider the following type of APIs as sensitive: the API
parameter is totally controlled by adversaries, which means the destination of the Intent message to
be sent is totally determined by adversaries. For other Intent-sending APIs, we treat them as regular
inter-component communications.
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3.3 System Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of EOEDroid and illustrate it with the motivating
example described in the previous section. The technical details of EOEDroid are presented in
Section 3.4.
We use the following basic concepts and notations:
• A Symbolic Conditional Statement: a conditional statement whose operands are symbolic.
• Path Constraints: all constraints that must be satisfied when guiding an app to execute a path.
Different from prior work, EOEDroid involves both symbolic and non-symbolic conditional
statements in path constraints.
• Input Constraints: A subset of path constraints but are only related to event handlers’ input.
We assume that s is the target program state that leads to the execution of a critical functionality;
f is the target critical functionality; p0 is the path containing f ; eh0 is the event handler containing
p0.
3.3.1 Overview
EOEDroid consists of three modules: event handler analysis, program state analysis, and exploit
code generation, as shown in Figure 3.2. In the first module, selective symbolic execution is used to
explore paths in the event handlers and collect path constraints. To apply the technique for Android
hybrid apps, technical challenges (Section 3.4.2) are addressed by four sub-modules: analysis
sandbox, heuristic generation, Intent handler, and array-indexing type implicit flow handler. More
specifically, given an app, “selective symbolic execution” is called to repeatedly test each event
handler until all the inside interesting paths are traversed. The interesting paths are discovered
by the sub-module “heuristic-generation”. Note that when a branch is flagged as interesting, no
matter whether the conditional statement is symbolic or not, EOEDroid forcely traverses this path.
Meanwhile, the corresponding path constraint is constructed and saved.
For each round of test, the sub-module “analysis sandbox” is applied to guard the analysis
environment from pollution and keep each round of test independent.
In the second phase, the module “program state analysis” runs to discover state s and learn
how to reach s by manipulating event handlers’ input and execution order, which are handled by
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the sub-modules “event handler input generation” and “event handler execution order generation”
respectively. For event handlers’ input, it is generated by applying an SMT solver in the associated
input constraints collected in the first phase. For event handlers’ execution order, it is generated by
solving the event handler dependency problem.
For each path p that contains critical functionalities, EOEDroid repeatedly resolves all event
handler dependencies for p with four steps: (1) it analyzes p’s path constraints to identify all
non-symbolic conditional statements; (2) it confirms the expected value v for each conditional
statement; (3) starting from each conditional statement c, it performs backward program analysis to
determine the variables O that can influence c’s operands, and further computes the required value
for each variable in O; and (4) it analyzes all paths in all event handlers that contain the instructions
changing the variables in O to their corresponding expected values.
In the third phase, the module exploit code generation generates exploit code for each exploitable
critical functionality. First, the event handlers’ execution order generated in the second phase is
converted to the web event order, and the event handlers’ input is converted to the corresponding
web events’. Second, if JavaScript code is required as the event handler’s input (such as the callback
function in our motivating example), the syntax of the associated JavaScript code is parsed and
analyzed to generated required JavaScript code.
3.3.2 Analyzing the Example
Now we illustrate how EOEDroid works for our motivating example. When the event handler
shouldOverrideUrlLoading() is triggered, EOEDroid is started. First of all, EOEDroid symbolizes
the event handler’s second parameter as ‘InputUrl’, since its value can be controlled by adversaries.
Then, EOEDroid analyzes each instruction. As the class Uri is frequently used, we model it
by symbolizing its instance u as ‘Uri.<init>(InputUrl)’. The input’s scheme and host are also
symbolized, whose symbolic expressions are ‘Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getScheme()’ and ‘Uri.<init>(I
nputUrl).getHost()’, respectively.
When the conditional statement C1 is analyzed, “heuristic generation” is started to discover
which branches are interesting. In this case, both branches have interesting instructions. So both of
them are sequentially traversed. In the true branch, when an Intent message is sent to another app or
component, the module “Intent handler” (Section 3.4.2.3) is set up to fill the symbolic information
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gap between the sender and receiver.
Similarly, the conditional statements C2, C3 and C4 are processed. In C4’s true branch,
EOEDroid encounters a special conditional statement that is non-symbolic (i.e., C5). As its true
branch is interesting, EOEDroid forcely executes it and also collects necessary information, such
as the executed path information, the instruction’s position (such as <MyClient.java, C5>), the
condition expression (i.e., tmpbool == 0), the operand variable (i.e., tmpbool), current value of the
variable (i.e., 0) and its selected branch (i.e., 1). Note that in this path the external field variable
Initialized is written. To ensure each round of test is independent, such interaction between the
event handler and the external variable is handled by the sub-module “analysis sandbox”.
The conditional statement C6 is then reached. In the true branch, the host name is split to an
array, whose symbolic expression is Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getHost().split("."). Then, an implicit
flow is faced, which is caused by the Hashmap accessing operation. To handle it, the sub-module
“implicit flow handler” is started to try all possibilities in the Hashmap instance. Therefore, a critical
functionality is found in getId() in Class2, which can be leveraged by adversaries to perform
cross-frame DOM manipulation and steal the device ID information. The main associated path
constraints are shown in Listing 3.1.
(1) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getScheme().equals("market") == 0
(2) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getScheme().equals("tel") == 0
(3) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getScheme().equals("sms") == 0
(4) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getHost().equals("developer.com") == 0
(5) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getScheme().equals("sdk") 6= 0
(6) tmpbool 6= 0
(7) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getHost().split(".").length == 3
(8) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getHost().split(".")[0].equals("c2") 6= 0 // generated by
implicit flow handler
(9) Uri.<init>(InputUrl).getHost().split(".")[1].equals("getId") 6= 0
Listing 3.1: Path Constraints in Executing getId()
In the second phase, the module “program state analysis” analyzes the path constraints (Listing
3.1) to change the program state. First, the sub-module “event handler input generation” checks if
the constraints can be satisfied by feeding the event handler with appropriate input. In this case,
all constraints except (6) can be satisfied. Second, the sub-module “event handler execution order
generation” runs to check how to influence the program state to satisfy the constraint (6). Starting
from the conditional statement C6, EOEDroid backward tracks the operand tmpbool along the
executed path, and confirms the variable (i.e., Initialized) can influence its value. Next, EOEDroid
goes through all paths identified in the first phase to check whether there is a path that contains
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an instruction changing Initialized’s value. It finds that Path3 contains the expected operation.
Hence, there is an event handler dependency on C6: <shouldOverrideUrlLoading(), Path3>
C6
−→
<shouldOverrideUrlLoading(), Path4>.
In the third phase, the module “exploit code generation” generates the exploit code for the
critical functionality in getId(). To drive the app to execute the critical functionality, event handlers
should be executed as follows:
(1) shouldOverrideUrlLoading(webview, "sdk://init")
(2) shouldOverrideUrlLoading(webview, "sdk://c2.getId.?")
Then, the above event handler execution order is converted to the web event order, and further
transformed to the following HTML/JavaScript code (based on our event handler study presented in
Section 3.4.1):
<iframe src="sdk://init"/>
<iframe src="sdk://c2.getId.?"/>
The above code can change the program state and reach the sensitive API loadUrl(). However,
part of the event handler’s input is still missing, which is a JavaScript callback function used
to receive the sensitive information (i.e., device ID). To address this problem, the sub-module
“JavaScript code syntax analysis” runs to analyze the syntax of the parameter of loadUrl(), and
generate required JavaScript code. Finally, the following exploit code is generated, which can help
developers test and verify the EOE problem.
1 <script>
2 function steal_device_id(id) {
3 document.write("<" + "img src=’" + "http://attacker.com/" + id + "’ />")
4 }
5 </script>
6 <iframe src="sdk://init"/>
7 <iframe src="sdk://c2.getId.steal_device_id"/>
Listing 3.2: Exploit Code
3.4 Technical Approaches
In this section, we first present our study of events and event handlers in WebView to understand
their constraints for triggering event-oriented exploits. We then present technical details about the
design and implementation of selective symbolic execution, program state analysis, and exploit
code generation.
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Table 3.1: The Systematic Study Result. The third column ‘JS?’ means: ‘Is JavaScript required to
trigger the event?’, and the forth column ‘E0?’ means: ‘Does the event handler only deal with
events from E0?’. In answers, we useXand blank to indicate ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, respectively.
Event Handlers and Main Parameters Handled Events JS? E0? Example Trigger Code (HTML/JavaScript/HTTP)
onFormResubmission Resubmitting a form X [HTML] <form ...> [JS] form.resubmit()
onPageCommitVisible(url) [HTML] <body bgcolor="#0f0" ..> <img bgcolor="#0f0" ..
doUpdateVisitedHistory(url, isReloaded) Updating history X X [JS] document.location="url"
onPageStarted(url, icon) Starting to load a page X X [JS] document.location="url", reload()
onPageFinished(url) finishing loading a page X X Trigger Constraint
onReceivedError(errorcode, description, url) Failing to load a page [HTML] <iframe src="http://invalid.url" ...
onReceivedSslError(error) SSL error [HTML] <iframe src="https://invalid.url"...
onReceivedClientCertRequest(request) Client cert request [HTTP] Send client cert request
onReceivedHttpAuthRequest (host, realm) Authentication request [HTTP] Send authorization header
onReceivedHttpError(request, response) HTTP error [HTTP] Send 404 header
onReceivedLoginRequest(realm, account, arg) Login request [HTTP] Send x-auto-login header
onScaleChanged(old_scale, new_scale) Updating scale X [JS] document.body.style.zoom=...
shouldOverrideKeyEvent(keyevent) Pressing key X [JS] dispatch key-press event
onUnhandledKeyEvent(keyevent) Facing an unhandled key X Trigger Constraint
shouldInterceptRequest(request) Resources loading [HTML] <img src="... >, <iframe src="http://... >
onLoadResource(url) Loading a resource Trigger Constraint
shouldOverrideUrlLoading(url [or request]) URL navigation [HTML] <iframe src="customizedScheme://...>
onCreateWindow Creating a window X [JS] window.open()
onCloseWindow Closing a window X [JS] window.close()
onConsoleMessage(message) Printing messages X [JS] console.log()
onGeolocationPermissionsShowPrompt (origin) GPS request X [JS] navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition()
onGeolocationPermissionsHidePrompt X Trigger Constraint
onShowCustomView Entering full screen X [HTML] <video ... controls>[JS] webkitRequestFullScreen()
onHideCustomView Quitting full screen X Trigger Constraint
onJsBeforeUnload(url, message, result) Leaving a webpage X [JS] dispatch onbeforeunload event
onJsAlert(url, message, result) Popuping an alert box X [JS] alert()
onJsConfirm(url, message, result) Popuping a confirm box X [JS] confirm()
onJsPrompt(url, message, defaultValue, result) Popuping a prompt box X [JS] prompt()
onPermissionRequest(request) Permission request X [JS] navigator.getUserMedia()
onPermissionRequestCanceled(request) Request is cancelled X
onRequestFocus Requesting focus X [HTML] <input type="text" id="name" . . . [JS] focus();
onShowFileChooser Browsing file system X [HTML] <input type="file" . . . [JS] dispatch a click event
onProgressChanged(progress) Page loading status
onReceivedIcon(icon) Receiving a icon
onReceivedTitle(title) Receiving a title
onReceivedTouchIcon(url, precomposed) Receiving an apple touch icon
onDownloadStart(url, userAgent, contentDisposition,
mimetype, contentLength)
Downloading a file [HTML] <iframe src="http://url.apk" ...
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3.4.1 Understanding Event Handler Triggering Constraints
The official Android documentation of events and event handlers is obscure and incomplete. We
hence conduct a systematic study based on both reading documents about WebView on the web
and analyzing real-world hybrid apps. The main study result is shown in Table 3.1. We find that 37
events are available for adversaries in WebView. The triggering code for each event is shown in
the fifth column. Note that the DOM element ‘<iframe src=...>’ can directly trigger two events,
whose corresponding event handlers are shouldOverrideUrlLoading() and shouldInterceptRequest(),
respectively. It depends on the attribute src’s content s. If s’s scheme is not ‘HTTP’ and ‘HTTPS’,
but customized, the former one is triggered. Otherwise, the latter one is triggered.
As reported in the third column, using HTML code, adversaries can trigger 15 event handlers,
including popular event handlers shouldOverrideUrlLoading() and shouldInterceptRequest(). Note
that, four of them require supports from the web server side to get appropriate HTTP response
code. For instance, onReceivedLoginRequest(webview, realm, account, args) can be triggered by
the combination of the HTML code “<iframe src="http://attacker.com/login">” and the HTTP
response header “x-auto-login:realm=x&account=y&args=z”, which is from the malicious server
“attacker.com”. x, y, and z are passed to onReceivedLoginRequest() as function parameters. As
the above example shows, adversaries can pass data from the web context to the native context. In
our study, we find that the parameters of 29 event handlers can be influenced by adversaries. More
details are shown in the first column (i.e., the parameters between parentheses).
As reported in the fourth column, triggering event handlers are influenced by the level of web
frames where the events occur. We find that events which occur in the main frame could trigger all
event handlers, whereas the capability of events in subframes is limited. More specifically, three
event handlers cannot be triggered by events that occur in the main frame. Let Ei (i ≥ 0) be the
events that occur in the ith level web frame and can be handled by event handlers, E denotes all
events available in the whole WebView space and E0 denotes the events available in the main frame,
they have the following relationship: E0 = E while Ei ⊏ E (i > 0).
3.4.1.1 Event Triggering Constraints
The constraints for triggering events are mainly caused by the status of JavaScript. As reported
in Table 3.1, almost 60% of the event handlers require JavaScript enabled to trigger.
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3.4.1.2 Event Handler Triggering Constraints
The constraints for triggering event handlers are mainly from two aspects:
I: The frame level. Triggering three of the event handlers require their corresponding events
to occur in the main frame. Adversaries must inject malicious code into the main frame, which is
usually well protected. Also, it is easy for users to realize the injected web code, because it may
reload web pages.
II: Predetermined execution orders. Several event handlers’ execution orders are predetermined
in WebView, which also imposes constraints on triggering the event handlers. To understand these
predetermined execution orders, we create an experimental app which registers all event handlers,
and profile them when they are invoked. Then, the app loads fuzzing HTML/JavaScript code. We
also apply static analysis to track the return values of all event handlers. If an event handler’s return
value appears in a conditional statement, and later another event handler is called, a predetermined
event order may exist. Finally, we confirm five predetermined execution orders:
1. shouldInterceptRequest()→ onLoadResource(): The latter event handler is called only when
the former event handler returns null.
2. shouldOverrideKeyEvent() → onUnhandledKeyEvent(): The latter event handler is only
called when the former event handler returns false.
3. onPageStarted() → ... → onPageFinished(): When WebView starts loading a web page,
onPageStarted() is called. When WebView finishes loading the page, onPageFinished() is called.
During the process, other event handlers may be called as well, such as onReceivedError() and
shouldInterceptRequest().
4. onPageStarted() can be called multiple times before onPageFinished() is called. This happens
when there are URL redirections in the web server side (i.e., 3xx HTTP response code). The number
of times that onPageStarted() is called depends on the URL redirection number. Moreover,
generally, onPageFinished() is only called once, no matter how many URL redirections there are.
But if the last HTTP response code is 4xx, WebView may be redirected to show a page-not-found
HTML, and then, onPageFinished() is called again.
5. onGeolocationPermissionsShowPrompt()→ onGeolocationPermissionsHidePrompt() and
onShowCustomView()→ onHideCustomView(): When location permission is requested, or Full
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Screen is entered, these events are called sequentially.
3.4.1.3 Adversaries’ Capability: Playing Gadgets
Adversaries can change program states by manipulating gadgets’ input and execution orders.
More specifically, adversaries can pass data to web events, and then the data are passed to the
corresponding event handlers as their function parameters. Adversaries can also trigger events and
event handlers in arbitrary orders, even though there are constraints on triggering events and event
handlers.
Gadgets’ Input. Adversaries may be able to control event handlers’ parameters. For example,
shouldInterceptRequest()’s parameter (i.e., request) can be set as ‘‘https://attacker.com/img’’, if
adversaries use the HTML code “<iframe src="https://attacker.com/img"></iframe>” to trigger
the event handler.
Gadgets’ Execution Orders. Consider two event handlers eh1 and eh2, there are two cases to
analyze: (1) If eh1 and eh2 do not have any relationship, adversaries can call them in any order
(i.e., eh1→e2 and eh2→eh1); (2) If eh1 must be executed before eh2, their relationship should be
t
−→ eh1
c
−→ eh2, where t is the trigger code to call eh1 and c is the pre-condition that must be satisfied
to trigger eh2. By repeating t and make c be satisfied, we may get the event handler sequence
(eh1eh2eh1eh2), which includes expected sequences (both eh1→eh2 and eh2→eh1).
3.4.2 Selective Symbolic Execution
To apply symbolic execution in event handlers, we address four challenges (with details in
following subsections):
• Path explosion: To address this notorious problem, EOEDroid uses static analysis to provide
heuristic information for path selection. However, static analysis may introduce false negatives
to the heuristic information. To avoid it, we conservatively and safely apply static analysis on
only a certain number of instructions that do not cause false negatives (Section 3.4.2.1).
• Unsupported fork(): In existing dynamic symbolic execution based approaches, fork() is
frequently used to help systems traverse branches and keep the analysis environment clean.
However, in Android, fork() is not supported. Instead, EOEDroid needs to sequentially
traverse branches. However, different with desktop software, it is expensive to save and
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restore states of Android apps. To fix the problem, we propose an analysis sandbox to handle
the interaction with the external environment (Section 3.4.2.2).
• Android Intent: Intent is frequently used in event handlers, such as triggering a GUI event
to open a GUI activity. However, it introduces semantic gap between Intent senders and
receivers. Figure 3.4 shows an example that an intent message is delivered between two apps.
The Intent message escapes from the Java context (i.e., DVM), enters the C/C++ context (i.e.,
Linux kernel), and finally returns to the Java context. This way raises challenges to track the
Intent message in the Java context. When the receiver obtains the message, the associated
symbolic information may be lost. To address the problem, we fill the gap between senders
and receivers by synchronizing the symbol information in both sides (Section 3.4.2.3).
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Figure 3.4: Intent in Inter-Apps Communications
• Array-indexing class implicit flows: In array-indexing type operations, if the index is symbolic,
it is challenging to determine which element should be returned. The problem is known
as "implicit flow". Similar problems also exist in other data structures such as Hashmap,
Android Bundle, and Android share preference. In real world, this type of operations and data
structures was frequently used in popular apps and ad libs, such as Google Ads.
To further demonstrate the problem, we use Hashmap as the example. As Figure 3.5 shows,
in Java, Hashmap is implemented based on a bucket array with linked lists that are used
to handle hashing collisions. Assume that the instruction v = M.get(k) is being executed,
whereM is the Hashmap object, k is the key and it is symbolized as ‘key’. In the function
Hashmap.get(), the bucket index is firstly determined, which is k’s hashcode. Hence, the
index is a symbolic expression built on key. Then, an array-indexing operation is done to
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obtain the associated linked-list. Since the index is symbolic, the operation introduces an
implicit flow.
To mitigate the problem, we instrument k to brute-forcely try all possibilities of keys (Section
3.4.2.4).
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Figure 3.5: The Internal Structure of HashMap
We implement selective symbolic execution by instrumenting the Android framework and
Dalvik virtual machine (DVM). In Android frameworks, event handler functions and sensitive
APIs (Section 3.2.5) are handled. In DVM, the mapping between variables and their corresponding
symbolic expressions are managed through a global symbolic table. To support string operations,
which are frequently faced in event handlers, the associated string APIs are modeled, including
compare, append, replace, search, substring and split, and we use Z3-Str [35] to resolve string based
path constraints.
3.4.2.1 Heuristic Generation
The heuristic information used in path selection includes the indication of whether a branch is
interesting. To determine it, EOEDroid uses static analysis to scan a certain number (such as 100)
of instructions in advance to check if a critical functionality is contained.
Due to the imprecision of static analysis, false negatives may be introduced. The determination
result may be further influenced. To eliminate the concern, we also flag the following types of
operations as interesting:
• Field variables reading and writing: This affects points-to and alias relationship.
• Virtual function invocation: Resolving this kind of invocations requires points-to information.
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• Java Reflection: Due to the lack of real data, it is challenging for static analysis to solve this
kind of problems.
• Return Instruction: In event handlers, the returned values of some event handlers (Section
3.4.1) are meaningful, such as shouldOverrideUrlLoading() and shouldInterceptRequest().
Take the former event handler as the example: If the event handler returns true, it means the
app being analyzed handles the input. Otherwise, the Android system processes the input.
3.4.2.2 Analysis Sandbox
To keep the analysis environment clean, EOEDroid creates a sandbox environment to replace
the real environment. All interactions with the external real environment is redirected to the sandbox
environment. Based on the access direction, the interactions can be divided into two categories:
writing and reading. For the writing operation, EOEDroid updates variables’ values in the sandbox
instead of the real environment. For the reading operation, if the destination variable is written
earlier, the corresponding value in the sandbox is retrieved and returned; otherwise, the value in the
real environment is returned.
In this dissertation, we consider the interactions include accessing file system, global variables,
and field variables whose scopes are bigger than the event handler function being analyzed. To
implement them, necessary APIs and instructions are hooked and handled. For reading and
writing files, the corresponding POSIX APIs (in libcore\io\Posix.java) are handled. However, it is
challenging to maintain a file’s status, especially when the file is partially modified. To mitigate
the problem, a backup file is created, and then all reading and writing operations are redirected to
the backup file. For reading and writing global and field variables, the associated instructions (i.e.,
iget/iput, aget/aput, and sget/sput) [11] are handled. In practice, it is challenging to determine the
scope of a field variable. To simplify the problem, all changes on the field variable are recorded.
Please note that in the beginning of each round of test, all data and files saved in the sandbox are
cleaned.
3.4.2.3 Intent Handler
To fill the symbolic information gap between Intent message senders and receivers, it is critical
to restore symbolic information of the message in the receiver side. For this purpose, when the
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Intent message is sent, EOEDroid temporally pauses the program by hooking the associated APIs
(such as startActivity(Intent)), makes snapshot on the Intent object and its corresponding symbolic
data, and also saves it. Then, when the receiver accepts and reads the message using associated
APIs (such as getIntent()), the snapshot is read, and then the symbolic information is linked with
the Intent object. Considering the sender and receiver may be not in the same app, such a snapshot
is dumped to a public folder, which is allowed to be accessed by any app.
As variables’ absolute memory addresses are used to save their symbolic information in the
snapshot, in the receiver side the restored symbolic information cannot be directly applied in the
received Intent message, whose memory addresses are totally different from the sent message. To
correct the differences, when the snapshot is made in the sender side, memory addresses are changed
to relative addresses, based on the starting address of the sent message. Then, when the snapshot is
read in the receiver side, memory addresses are changed back to the absolute addresses, based on
the starting address of the received message.
Furthermore, to distinguish different Intent messages, each message is assigned a unique ID,
which is also used as the corresponding snapshot’s name. To support it, a new integer field “IntentId”
is added into the Intent Java class. Each time an Intent message is created, the field is automatically
added by one.
3.4.2.4 Array-Indexing Type Implicit Flow
To mitigate the problem caused by this type of implicit flows, we brute-forcely convert the
associated operation into multiple conditional statements. Array and other data structures are
handled respectively as follows:
• Array: Assume the content of an array A is [e0, e1, e2, ..., en], and in the operation r = A[i], i
is symbolic. The operation can be converted to the following structure :
if (0 == i) r = e0;
else if (1 == i) r = e1;
...;
else if (n == i) r = en;
Next, EOEDroid can handle the operation as regular conditional statements.
• Hashmap, Android Bundle, and Android Share Preference: Similar to array-indexing op-
erations, hashmap type accessing can also be transformed to conditional statements. As-
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sume that the following instruction is faced: r = hashmap.get(k). The keys of hashmap is
[k0, k1, k2, ..., kn]. Hence, by instrumenting k’s real value in memory, the operation can also
be converted to regular conditional statements.
if (k.equals(k0)) k = k0;
else if (k.equals(k1)) k = k1;
... ;
else if (k.equals(kn)) k = kn;
r = hashmap.get(k);
To support the above operations, all keys in the hashmap object must be retrieved. However, it
is challenging to do that in the low level layer (e.g., DVM). To fix the problem, the HashMap
class is instrumented by adding a string array to record all keys. Thus, in the DVM, all keys
can be retrieved by restoring the values of the added string array.
3.4.3 Program State Analysis
To discover how to reach the program state that leads to the execution of a critical functionality,
we deal with the input and execution order of event handlers respectively.
3.4.3.1 Event Handler Input Generation
Given an arbitrary interesting path, its input can be generated by handling its associated path
constraints that are collected in the first phase. First, input constraints are extracted from the whole
path constraints by filtering out the constraints of non-symbolic conditional statements. Second, the
input can be generated by resolving the input constraints using an SMT solver (e.g., Z3-Str).
3.4.3.2 Event Handler Execution Order Generation
Given a path that contains a critical functionality, the execution order of event handlers can
be obtained by addressing the event handler dependency problem. The algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, three critical functions are required as input:
• NS(eh, p, insn): Non-symbolic conditional statements can be extracted by going backward
through p starting from insn and checking the operands of all faced conditional statements.
• get_origin_variables(eh, p, insn, v): We define the origin variables as following. If in p, v′
can influence v’s value, v′ is an origin variable of v. Hence, to locate all v′, we go backward
through p starting from insn, and apply backward data flow tracking on v. If a variable is
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found in the backward data flow and located in the external environment, the variable may be
one of v’s origin variables.
• get_origin_values(eh, p, O, insn, value): To compute the expected values of origin variables,
we re-run symbolic execution on p to construct v’s symbolic expression relying on origin
variables. To this end, all origin variables in the set O are symbolized. Then, p is executed
and analyzed by feeding eh with appropriate input. Next, when conditional statements are
faced, the path constraint is constructed and saved. After that, when the instruction insn is
faced, the analysis is finished. Finally, the values of origin variables can be generated by
resolving the collected path constraints.
3.4.4 Exploit Code Generation
Algorithm 2 shows our algorithm to generate the exploit code. Two main functions (get_web_tr
igger_code() and get_js()) are required. The former function is implemented based on our study
result (Table 3.1), and the latter function is provided by the sub-module “JavaScript code syntax
analysis”.
3.4.4.1 JavaScript Code Syntax Analysis
. It is challenging to generate required JavaScript code as part of an event handler’s input.
Because the JavaScript code is executed by associated WebView APIs (such as loadUrl()), the
values of these APIs’ parameters provide hints. Suppose the JavaScript code extracted from input
is I , and the JavaScript code that already exists in associated WebView APIs (such as hard code
format) is J . I + J have complete semantics.
To mitigate the problem, we assume that I is atomic, i.e., it is a leaf element in the AST (Abstract
Syntax Tree) of I + J . We can hence generate I based on its position in the AST. More specifically,
when a WebView API that can execute JavaScript code (such as WebView.loadUrl()) is executed, its
parameter’s symbolic expression is dumped. Then, by replacing I with a specific concrete string
(such as a randomized string), the concrete string of the parameter (i.e., I + J) is generated. Next,
by applying a JavaScript interpreter engine (such as Mozilla Rhino 1.6) in I + J , AST is generated.
After that, I’s semantics can be understood by checking AST’s semantics and locating I in AST.
Finally, concrete JavaScript code of I can be generated.
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Algorithm 1 Event Order Generation
Input:
1: EH : all event handlers;
2: P(eh) : return all paths in the event handler eh;
3: NS(eh, p, insn) : return all non-symbolic conditional statements before the instruction insn in the path p of the event handler eh;
4: get_origin_variables(eh, p, insn, v) : return the variable v‘s origin variables that influence v’s value;
5: get_origin_values(eh, p, insn, v, value, O) : return the required values for all origin variables that can assign value to v.
Output: the event order R
1: function GENERATE_EVENT_HANDLER_ORDER(eh, p, expect_insn)
2: for ns in NS(eh, p, expect_insn) do
3: c← ns’s condition expression
4: v← c’s value ⊲ Depending on which branch is taken, v is true or false.
5: r← resolve_event_handler_dependency(eh, p, ns, c, v)
6: if FAILURE == r then
7: return FAILURE
8: end if
9: end for
10: return SUCCESS
11: end function
12:
13: function RESOLVE_EVENT_HANDLER_DEPENDENCY(eh, p, insn, variable, value)
14: O← get_origin_variables(eh, p, insn, variable)
15: if O == φ then
16: R← {} return FAILURE
17: end if
18: for o in O do
19: if o ∈ eh’s parameters then
20: R.add(<eh, p>)
21: end if
22: end for
23: for (oi, vi) in get_origin_values(eh, p, insn, value, O) do ⊲ Rerun symbolic execution on the path p to compute each origin variable’s
expected value
24: for eh′ in E do
25: for p′ in P(eh′) do
26: insn′ ← the instruction writing oi
27: r← resolve_event_handler_dependency(eh′, p′, insn′, oi, vi)
28: if FAILURE == r then
29: R← {} return FAILURE
30: end if
31: end for
32: end for
33: end for
34: return SUCCESS
35: end function
Algorithm 2 Exploit Code Generation
Input:
1: EO : the event handler execution order, which is the set of the pair <eh, p>;
2: get_input(eh, p) : return eh’s input that can guide the app to execute p;
3: get_web_trigger_code(eh, parameter): return web code that can trigger eh and pass parameter to eh
4: get_js(eh, p) : return required JavaScript code
5:
Output: the exploit code X
1: function GENERATE_EXPLOIT_CODE(eh, p)
2: for <ehi, pi> in EO do
3: X += gen_js(ehi, pi)
4: input← get_input(ehi, (pi)
5: X += gen_event_trigger_code(ehi, input)
6: end for
7: end function
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Figure 3.6: AST of I + J
We use the code in Figure 3.3 to illustrate how this sub-module works. In the event handler
shouldOverrideUrlLoading(), I is passed to getId() and executed to receive sensitive information.
To automatically generate concrete JavaScript code of I , loadUrl()’s parameter is firstly dumped.
Suppose the device ID is “1234”. The parameter’s symbolic expression is then ‘‘javascript: + U
ri.<init>(InputUrl).getHost().split(".")[2] + ("1234")’’. By replacing the symbolic data with a
concrete string (such as “x”), a concrete example code of I + J may be ‘‘javascript:x(1234)’’.
Next, AST (Figure 3.6) can be generated by applying Rhino in the JavaScript code “x(1234)”. By
locating x in AST, we can find that x is a function name, and the function has only one string
parameter. Hence, a JavaScript function (such as steal_device_id() in Listing 3.2) that satisfies the
requirement can be defined in advance, and then the function name is passed to the event handler
shouldOverrideUrlLoading().
3.5 Evaluation
To evaluate EOEDroid, we implemented it on Android 4.3, and deployed it in a Nexus 10
smartphone. Given apps, we started the random UI exploration tool Android Monkey [36] to trigger
as many WebView components as possible.
Note that it is challenging to automatically trigger a UI component. To mitigate the problem,
We run Monkey to simulate users’ behaviors. Furthermore, we also use Monkey as the first-layer
filter. The intuition is that if WebView is an important part of the app, it will be likely triggered in
this way. Thus we reduce our workload by only considering the apps whose WebView components
are successfully triggered in our dataset (Section 3.5.1).
Once a WebView complement is triggered, complete fuzzing code is injected to trigger all event
handlers. More specifically, when WebView is going to connect to a web server, we start a crawler
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to check whether an HTTP link is involved in the connection. We limit the crawling depth in
three levels. If there is an HTTP link, man-in-the-middle attacks is performed (Section 3.2.2). The
proxy tool “mitmproxy” [37] is used to inject web event trigger (fuzzing) code, which is generated
based on the study result (Section 3.4.1). Hence, once the injected code is loaded and executed in
WebView, all event handlers are triggered, and then, EOEDroid is started to analyze them.
3.5.1 Dataset
In our evaluation, we collected apps as our evaluation dataset from two different app groups
based on whether the WebView component could be triggered at run time. Both these two groups
were collected from the Android official store Google Play. The first app group consists of 13,000
popular apps that we crawled from 26 categories, and extracted 500 most popular free apps for each
category. The other app group contains 220 browser apps, which were collected by searching the
key word ‘web browser’ in Google Play.
Finally, 3,652 apps were totally collected as our dataset, with 3,552 apps from the first app
group and 212 apps from the second app group.
3.5.2 Findings
Our experiment casts light on the usage of event handlers in real-world hybrid apps. It also
reveals interesting facts about EOE in hybrid apps.
3.5.2.1 Usage of Event Handlers
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of the usage of top 20 event handlers. shouldOverrideUrlLoad-
ing() and onPageFinished() are the two most frequently used event handlers.
We also found most hybrid apps define their own event handlers. In our dataset (Section 3.5.1),
3,440 of 3,652 (94.2%) hybrid apps implemented their event handlers. It is clear that event handlers
are in widespread use in real-world apps. Next we discuss the typical scenarios in which event
handlers are used in apps.
• Access Control: Event handlers can be applied to perform access control on the communication
to be accessed, and the content to be loaded in WebView. For instance, shouldInterceptRequest()
can check the content requested by web code. If the content is not expected, the event handler
can directly return null to reject the access.
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Figure 3.7: Usage of Event Handlers
• Customized URL Scheme: Event handlers can be used to support customized URLs. For instance,
the link “tel:xx” and “smsto:xx” can be supported to make a phone call and send a text message.
• Event Driven Authentication: Using customized URL schemes, event handlers can also be applied
to perform authentication. Consider that shouldOverrideUrlLoading() supports a customized
URL scheme “sdk”. When the URL “sdk://auth_request” is received, the event handler redirects
WebView to the authentication web site, while specifying the redirection URL as “sdk://auth_-
success”. Hence, when the URL “sdk://auth_success” is received by the event handler, the event
handler can learn the authentication is successfully done.
3.5.2.2 EOE in Event Handlers
By applying EOEDroid on the 3,652 hybrid apps, we successfully identified 97 vulnerabilities
in 58 hybrid apps, as briefly shown in Table 3.2. We also find several other interesting findings:
• Distribution of vulnerable Event Handlers: We found that most vulnerabilities (96/97) existed in
the event handler shouldOverrideUrlLoading(). The remaining two vulnerabilities were found in
onCreateWindow() and onReceivedHttpAuthRequest().
• Phishing: We found the usage of the API loadUrl() to load new content in WebView likely
introduced this type of vulnerabilities. It is mainly because developers wrongly assume the code
loaded in WebView is trustable, and do not set up security checks before the sensitive API is
called. In some apps, even though security checks were provided, these checks were incompetent
to protect the critical functionalities and could be evaded. Take the following code as the example.
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Vulnerability Type Number
Cross-Frame DOMManipulation 2
Phishing 53
Sensitive Information Leakage 30
Local Resource Access 1
Intent Abuse 11
Table 3.2: Vulnerabilities Found by EOEDroid
Adversaries could still hit the sensitive API by feeding the input ‘http://attacker.com/malicious/c
ode?from=developer.com’.
public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url) {
...
else if (url.contains("developer.com")) {
view.loadUrl(url);
return true;
• Cross-Frame DOM Manipulation: As shown in Table 3.2, different from phishing, there were
only a few cross-frame DOM manipulation vulnerabilities, even though loadUrl()’s parameter
was totally controlled by adversaries. This is because that it is challenging to transfer the prefix
string “javascript:” from the web code to the native code. Typically, in the web context, the
prefix string “javascript:” is directly handled by JavaScript engine, rather than triggering any web
events. However, using tricks it is still possible to deliver the prefix string. EOEDroid successfully
discovered two vulnerable event handlers that could be leveraged to pass JavaScript code to the
native context and execute the code. More details are discussed in our case studies in Section
3.5.3.1.
• Sensitive Information Leakage: In this category, EOEDroid successfully caught 26 vulnerable
event handlers that could be utilized to steal Android ID. The further study showed that all of
them were caused by an ad lib. The remaining 4 vulnerabilities were found in high profile browser
apps. The first vulnerable event handler (from “com.webroot.xxx”) could be leveraged to leak the
phone number to a public log file, which could be accessed by any app. The second vulnerable
event handler (from “com.kiddoware.xxx”) could be triggered to leak IMEI. The third event
handler (from “reactivephone.xxx”) could be exploited to steal GPS location information using
the input in a specific format. More specifically, if the URL to be accessed contained the string
“latitude,longitude”, the real GPS location data were retrieved to replace the string.
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The last vulnerable event handler (from “com.mx.xxx”) was interesting, which contained a
potential backdoor that could be used to steal sensitive information, such as IMEI. Although
developers had attempted to close the backdoor, EOEDroid found that it was still possible for
adversaries to leverage the backdoor by changing the program state through the manipulation of
execution orders of gadgets. More details are shown in our case study in Section 3.5.3.2.
• Local Resource Access: One vulnerable app was found that it could allow adversaries to access
local database. Even though this app checked the origin information of web code that was going
to access the database, it could still be bypassed by containing the developer website name.
• Intent Abuse: One of the vulnerabilities was found in the event handler of the Korean Air app,
which was allowed to send arbitrary intent message. Furthermore, the event handler also suffered
from phishing attacks and cross-frame DOM manipulation.
Other ten vulnerabilities were found in browser apps. It was mainly because browser apps
aimed to support the popular scheme “intent://”. However, these apps did not check the origin
information, and specify the action or destination class, which might cause serious problems, as
demonstrated by Wang et al. [14].
3.5.3 Case Studies
App Input Format
com.exsoul.xxx “exsoul://id=[0-9]{8}&url=”
com.fevdev.xxx “intent://...fallback_url=”
Table 3.3: The Input Format of the Two Vulnerable Apps Shown in Case 1
3.5.3.1 Case 1: Cross-Frame DOM Manipulation
This section presents two vulnerable apps that suffer from cross-frame manipulation attacks. To
transfer the prefix string “javascript:”, the input is crafted following the input format shown in Table
3.3. When the input is received and parsed by the event handler shouldOverrideUrlLoading(), the
content l of “url” and “fallback_url”is extracted and then fed into a sensitive API loadUrl(). Hence,
if l is in the format “javascript:...”, the JavaScript code can be then executed in the main frame.
41
3.5.3.2 Case 2 : Leveraging a Closed Backdoor
This high profile app has been downloaded more than 10 million times. The Listing 3.3 shows a
code snippet of the vulnerable event handler. In this app, the variable flag (Line 1) is initially false.
When the event handler shouldOverrideUrlLoading() is triggered, several conditional statements
are determined relying on the flag (Line 12) and the URL. In Line 24, the URL is saved to a local
variable, and then “%IMEI%” is replaced with real IMEI.
1 flag = false;
2
3 public void onPageFinished(WebView view, String url) {
4 ...
5 flag = true;
6 ...
7 }
8
9 public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url) {
10 ...
11 url = url.toLowerCase();
12 if (!flag)
13 ...
14 else {
15 if (url.startsWith("http://") || url.startsWith("https://")) ...
16 else if (url.startsWith("file://")||url.startsWith("content://")) ...
17 else if (url.startsWith("mx")) ...
18 else {
19 if (url.contains("app_name")) {
20 ...
21 String tmpstr = url;
22 // read imei from shared preference
23 String i = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(this).getString("
imei", "");
24 tmpstr = tmpstr.replaceAll("%IMEI%", i)
25 ...
26 // send a Intent message containing tmpstr
27 Intent intent = new ...;
28 intent.setData(Uri.parse(tmpstr));
29 startActivity(intent)
30 ...
Listing 3.3: Code Snippet Extracted From the Example in Case 2
By applying EOEDroid on this app, the vulnerable event handler’s path constraints are collected,
which are shown as follows.
(1) InputUrl.startsWith("http://") == 0
(2) InputUrl.startsWith("https://") == 0
(3) InputUrl.startsWith("file://") == 0
(4) InputUrl.startsWith("content://") == 0
(5) InputUrl.startsWith("mx") == 0
(6) InputUrl.contains("app_name") == 1
(7) flag == 1
(8) InputUrl.contains("%IMEI%") == 1
All constraints can be satisfied except (7). By addressing the event handler dependency problem
on (7), the event handler execution order is generated : onPageF inished()→ shouldOverrideUrl
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Loading().
However, due to the trigger constraint (Section 3.4.1), we found onPageFinished() was executed
after shouldOverrideUrlLoading(). Hence, to generate the required execution order, the web page
should be refreshed as follows.
(1) <script> window.location.reload(true); </script>
Then, the web code that can guide shouldOverrideUrlLoading() to execute the sensitive API
getDeviceId() is shown as follows, if assuming FTP is supported by users’ phone.
(2) <iframe src="ftp://attacker.com/app_name?imei=%IMEI%"/>
3.5.4 Performance and Accuracy
The performance and accuracy of EOEDroid may be impacted by our symbolic execution
implementation, where several heuristics are leveraged to mitigate the path explosion problem.
Admitting that these heuristics may cause over approximation and/or inaccuracy to our analysis, they
help us make a good tradeoff between performance and accuracy. In this section, we presented more
evaluation details, and showed that our current system performance and accuracy were acceptable.
For each app, the average successful analysis time of EOEDroid is around 4.2 minutes, including
3.4 minutes for the event handler analysis. Considering our tool is designed to analyze apps offline,
the overhead is acceptable.
We use false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) to measure EOEDroid’s accuracy. We
define a FP as that a non-vulnerable event handler is flagged as vulnerable, and a FN as that a
vulnerable event handler is identified as non-vulnerable. More details are shown below:
• False Positives: We manually analyzed all vulnerable event handlers by running the exploit code
generated by EOEDroid. Finally, we found that all vulnerabilities were successfully triggered,
which indicated EOEDroid’s FP rate was low.
• False Negatives: To confirm false negatives, we randomly selected 200 apps from the hybrid apps
that were flagged as non-vulnerable by EOEDroid. By carefully manually checking their event
handlers, we found all apps were non-vulnerable except two apps. Our further study on these two
apps showed that the main reason was that the SMT solver failed to resolve some path constraints
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that contained multiple regular expressions and string split operations. This still represents a low
FN rate for EOEDroid.
3.6 EOE Countermeasure Discussion
The key to counter EOE is that apps should only allow trustable web code to access critical
functionalities in event handlers. To achieve this, apps should first fully use HTTPS in all commu-
nications, which will effectively reduce the attack surface. Second, when a critical functionality
is called through an event handler, the frame level and origin information of web code should be
carefully checked.
The newest version of Android provides a new setting that only allows web code downloaded
over HTTPS to access shouldOverrideUrlLoading(), and also includes more information in the
event handler’s parameters, such as the frame level and origin information of web code. Hence,
we strongly recommend developers port their apps to the new version, and leverage these security
information in their development.
3.7 System Limitations and Future Work
EOEDroid is not perfect. First, currently we simply use Monkey to trigger WebView. Exploring
all possible UI components is a difficult issue, though orthogonal to this research. Second, in
EOEDroid, we do not solve all implicit flow problems, instead only focus on array-indexing type
operations, which are frequently used in event handlers. Finally, we do not handle all native code in
Android, instead only model important native code such as system.arraycopy(). In future work, we
plan to explore solutions in these directions to improve EOEDroid.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present our study on web events. We find in contrast to regular browsers, web
events are handled in a totally different way (i.e., the event handler bridge) in WebView. However,
there are no protection on the event handler bridge. Any web content can freely access sensitive
functionalities inside event handlers. In this chapter, we demonstrate this unauthorized access cause
serious consequences.
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4. STUDYING AND PROTECTING HYBRID POSTMESSAGES*
4.1 Overview
Motivation Cross-origin communication using the HTML5 postMessage facility [8] has been a
popular and often necessary technique on the web platform. It relaxes the restrictions enforced by
the well-known same origin policy (SOP) security model [6] by allowing bidirectional messaging
between mutually distrusting web frames or windows. With the increasing amalgamation of the
web and mobile platforms, postMessage has also found utility on WebView and hybrid apps
In addition to cross-origin communication, the hybrid mobile app model introduces the necessity
for cross-platform communication between the web platform and the mobile platform. Not only
do hybrid apps need to communicate between different origins loaded in a WebView, they must
also facilitate communication between those origins and the native layer (e.g., the Android Java
code). While hybrid apps can already utilize web-mobile bridges (such as the JavaScript Bridge) [9]
for cross-platform execution, cross-platform messaging in the form of HTML5 postMessage is not
available.
Android 6.0 partially addresses this shortcoming by providing a new cross-platform API called
postWebMessage(). However, this API is plagued by the notorious Android fragmentation problem
[22] and does not scale well. Moreover, it is limited to unidirectional communication from native to
web but does not support communication from web to native. In our empirical study on a set of
popular hybrid apps, we found postWebMessage() was rarely used in practice.
As a result, developers have resorted to customizing postMessage in hybrid apps using ad-hoc
methods such as web-mobile bridges (see Figure 4.1). In general, this customization treats the native
context as a new different-origin frame. This results in “hybrid postMessage”, which provides both
native-to-web (N→W ) and web-to-native (W→N ) messaging.
Unfortunately, while hybrid postMessage provides easy and convenient cross-platform commu-
nication, it also opens a door for adversaries through code injection attacks (such as web or network
* Part of this chapter is reprinted with the permission from “Study and Mitigation of Origin Stripping Vulnerabilities
in Hybrid-postMessage Enabled Mobile Applications”, Guangliang Yang, Jeff Huang, Guofei Gu, and Abner Mendoza.
In Proceedings of the 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP’18), Copyright c©2018 IEEE.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of Regular and Hybrid postMessage
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Figure 4.2: Sending Messages Through Regular and Hybrid postMessage
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Figure 4.3: Receiving Messages Through Regular and Hybrid postMessage
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attacks shown in Figure 4.1) to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, steal sensitive information,
silently access local hardware (such as the microphone), and perform other nefarious actions. The
security problem is rooted in the loss of the origin information when messages move across the
web and native layers. More specifically, the origin information of the message sender (source)
and message receiver (target) is either not respected or totally lost. There are two main reasons:
1) Hybrid postMessage may not provide any interface to allow the message sender to specify the
target origin, which is critical in the regular HTML5 postMessage to control the message receiver;
2) Hybrid postMessage may not provide the source origin of a received message, which means
it is impossible for the message receiver to validate the message. This adds a new layer to the
known security problem of client-side validation (CSV) in the web platform [19] [18] [20]. For
convenience, we term the novel security issue caused by hybrid postMessage “Origin Stripping
Vulnerability” (OSV).
Figures 4.2-4.3 illustrate that OSV may compromise the confidentiality and integrity of cross-
platform communication. Consider that adversaries inject malicious code into WebView through
web or network attacks. The malicious code may leverage hybrid postMessage to passively receive
and monitor messages that contain sensitive information, or actively send messages to arbitrary
message receivers to access their internal functionalities or data.
In Figure 4.2-a, Alice sends a message to Bob through the regular postMessage. The message
contains the message content ("How are you doing?"), and the target origin (Bob), which determines
that only Bob can receive the message. However, hybrid postMessage breaks this convention by
stripping the target origin (Figure 4.2-b). As a result, Mallory, an adversary who runs malicious code
in another web frame can receive and read the message. If the message carries sensitive information,
Mallory can easily violate the confidentiality of Alice and Bob’s communication. In Figure 4.3-a,
Bob is receiving a message from Alice. When the message arrives, Bob can validate that the source
origin of the message is Alice. However, hybrid postMessage loses the source origin information
(Figure 4.3-b), which means that it is impossible for Bob to conduct validation. Therefore, Mallory
may send a message ("What’s your password?") to Bob and access its confidential data.
Although the detailed implementation guideline and security model for postMessage are estab-
lished in HTML5 [8], it is challenging for developers to implement hybrid postMessage conforming
to it. The main obstacle is the gap between the web and native platforms. Web-mobile bridges may
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be applied to fill the gap. However, as shown in prior work [9] [10] [13], these bridges are often the
cause of security vulnerabilities, because any code loaded in WebView may freely access them.
For example, we found hybrid postMessage was implemented in the popular “Facebook React
Native” framework using the JavaScript Bridge. As shown in Listing 4.1, the crucial JavaScript
method window.postMessage() is rewritten to allow all messages to be sent to the native frame.
However, due to the intrinsic weakness of the JavaScript Bridge, the native frame cannot distinguish
the identity of the message senders, or even safely obtain the source origin.
1 WebView.loadUrl("javascript:"
2 "window.originalPostMessage = window.postMessage," +
3 "window.postMessage = function(data) {" +
4 // The source origin is lost.
5 // Only data is transferred through a JavaScript Bridge.
6 "__REACT_WEB_VIEW_BRIDGE.postMessage(String(data));" +
7 "}")
Listing 4.1: Implementing W→N in Facebook React Native
Existing defense solutions, such as NoFrak [9], Draco [10], MobileIFC [15], WIREframe [16],
and HybridGuard [17], were designed to provide protection for WebView and web-mobile bridges
by either extending SOP to the native layer, or enforcing security policies to offer access control.
However, they are circumscribed to prevent OSV for several reasons. First, most existing defense
solutions can only protectW→N , but not N→W . Only WIREframe can offer protection in two
directions. However, unfortunately, its security policies enforced in N→W may be under the
control of adversaries. Second, existing defense solutions are coarse-grained, and may have high
false negatives. Their provided protection is usually performed based on the origins of web frames,
and thus it is difficult for them to limit the behaviors of the embedded JavaScript code.
Moreover, existing defense solutions may be hindered by the blend of OSV and CSV vulnerabil-
ities. Consider a scenario in Figure 4.4 which we found in a real-world advertisement library. In the
web platform, a nested third-party iframe can send messages to the main frame, where a message
handler receives the messages but does not validate their source origins (i.e., CSV vulnerability). It
then forwards the received messages to the native frame through hybrid postMessage. After that,
the defense solutions are enforced to protectW→N . They attempt to obtain the message sender’s
origin to apply their policies. However, they can only obtain the main frame’s origin, rather than the
real message sender’s origin (i.e., the third-party frame’s).
CSV detection and defense solutions [19] [18] [20] may be applied to mitigate the above threat.
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Figure 4.4: Communication Among Three Frames
However, their performance may also be limited. They rely on the analysis or detection of source
origins of received messages. The messages received by the message handler of the main frame
include not only messages (“M1”) from the third-party frame, but also messages (“M2”) from the
native frame. They may protect M1, but not M2, because the source origin of M2 may not be
provided in hybrid postMessage.
We first conduct the systematic study on hybrid postMessage and identify the novel security
issue “OSV”. Second, to evaluate the prevalence and presence of hybrid postMessage and OSV
in Android hybrid apps, we design a lightweight detection tool, called OSV-Hunter, that can help
developers and analysts identify hybrid postMessage and discover potential OSVs. Different from
existing detection tools [13, 38], which fall short of filling the web-mobile gap and tracking origins,
OSV-Hunter automatically discovers message senders and receivers, and analyzes the semantics of
the link between them.
Third, we evaluate OSV-Hunter using a set of popular apps. We found 74 apps implemented
hybrid postMessage, and all these apps suffered from OSV, which may be exploited by adversaries to
perform denial of service (DoS), local critical hardware device access (such as real-time microphone
monitoring), data race, internal data manipulation, and so on. Several popular frameworks and
libraries suffer from OSV, such as Facebook React Native and Google cloud print. Several high-
profile apps are also impacted, such as Adobe Reader and WPS office. In addition to the Android
platform, OSV also impacts other platforms (like iOS), since the hybrid postMessage APIs of
vulnerable frameworks (such as Facebook React Native) are also available in these platforms.
We have reported all our findings to the Android security team, and the relevant framework,
library, or app developers. We are actively helping them fix the discovered OSV problem. The
Facebook security team has confirmed our findings in the React Native development framework,
and they also admitted that it was difficult to eliminate the security problem caused by OSV in
their current implementation. Instead, they explicitly added a security warning in their development
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documentation [39].
Lastly, motivated by the above difficulty faced by developers to eliminate OSV, we design
and implement a set of new hybrid postMessage APIs in the newest WebView, called OSV-Free.
Our evaluation shows that OSV-Free is secure and fast, and it is generic and resilient to the
notorious Android fragmentation problem. We also demonstrate that OSV-Free is easy to use, by
applying OSV-Free to harden the complex “Facebook React Native” framework. OSV-Free is open
source, and its source code and more implementation and evaluation details are available online:
http://success.cse.tamu.edu/lab/osv-free.php.
4.2 The OSV Problem Definition
We define OSV based on the possible violation on postMessage’s security model (or design
guideline) [8], which is defined as follows. We assume SF and RF are the frames which a message
sender and its corresponding message receiver belong to respectively. The security model can be
defined using the following two rules:
• Rule I: When a message is being sent, its target origin Torigin should satisfy that 1) Torigin is
specified or implied; 2) Torigin = RForigin or Torigin =“*”.
• Rule II: When a message is being received, its source origin Sorigin should meet that 1) Sorigin is
defined; 2) Sorigin = SForigin; 3) Sorigin is unique for SF .
Hence, if the above two rules are not followed in hybrid postMessage, OSV may exist. For
convenience, we define four sub-vulnerabilities (i.e., V1 to V4) based on the violation of the above
two rules in two directions, as shown Table 4.1.
Direction Native→Web Web→ Native
Violated Rule Rule I Rule II Rule I Rule II
Sub-Vulnerability Type V1 V2 V3 V4
Table 4.1: Definitions of Four Sub-Types of OSV
The four OSV sub-vulnerabilities disclose more attack patterns than those discussed in Section
1.3. For example, consider a scenario in Figure 4.5. Alice and Mallory are web frames, while
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Figure 4.6: OSV-Hunter’s Workflow
Bob is a native frame. Bob sends messages to Alice through hybrid postMessage. Due to V2, the
source origin of the native frame may not be provided or not unique. Mallory may be able to forge a
message with the same source origin, by creating a nested controllable iframe that has the same
origin, and then sending a crafted message from the new iframe to Alice using the typical web
postMessage. When Alice receives the message, Alice notices that the source origin is the same as
the native frame’s. As a result, Alice treats Mallory as Bob and allows Mallory to access the internal
functionalities. If Alice carries critical functionalities or data, serious consequences may be caused.
To prevent V2, it is important to ensure the uniqueness of the source origin of the native frame.
However, even if the source origin is unique, it is hard to manage and may still introduce security
issues. For example, to receive messages from the native frame, Alice may need to relax its
validation logic for all incoming messages, which may cause CSV. In our evaluation (Section 4.4),
we show such problems exist in real-world apps.
4.3 OSV-Hunter Design and Implementation
4.3.1 Design Observations
OSV-Hunter is designed to identify apps with actual hybrid postMessage implementations, and
vet such implementations against OSV in a lightweight and generic way, based on several key
insights and observations:
• The JavaScript method window.postMessage() should be a message sender of hybrid postMessage:
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“window.postMessage()” may be 1) directly called in web frames, or 2) indirectly invoked in the
native frame through WebView JavaScript code loading APIs (such asWebView.loadUrl()). For
example, the following Java code sends native data (i.e., content) from the native frame to the
main web frame:
WebView.loadUrl("javascript:window.postMessage(’" + content + "’, ’*’)").
In both cases above, “window.postMessage()” should be a communication launcher (message
sender). To discover its corresponding message receiver, its parameter, especially the message
content c, should be tracked. If c appears in a function f of the opposite frame, f is likely a
message receiver.
To implement it, a special and unique string ID, such as “PM_Case1_<Random Number>” for
the first case and “PM_Case2_<Random Number>” for the second case, is injected into c
and tracked. More specifically, in the native frame, all native function invocations should be
checked to verify if their parameters contain ID. If ID is found, there should be a link between
window.postMessage() and the firstly found native function. For the second case, all message
handlers of web frames should be monitored. Once ID appears in the message handlers of a web
frame, there should also be a link from the native function that executes window.postMessage()
through WebView.loadUrl() to the message handlers of the web frame.
• A message handler of a web frame may be a message proxy, or receiver: It is possible for a message
handler to 1) receive messages from the native frame (i.e., N→W ), or 2) forward messages
received from other web frames to the native frame (i.e.,W→N ). The above possibilities can be
verified respectively. For the first possibility, the value of the parameter of the message handler
should be monitored to check if ID exists. For the second possibility, similar with how wind
ow.postMessage() is handled, the received message content of the message handler should be
tracked. For this purpose, if no ID exists in the received message content, a new ID, such as
“MH_ForwadingMessage_<Random Number>”, should be injected into the received message
content. When the message content is forwarded, if the ID appears in a native function in the
native frame, the native function is likely a message receiver. Hence, there may be a link between
the message handler of the web frame and the native function of the native frame.
• The APIs (such as web-mobile bridges) that provide cross-platform functionalities are likely
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utilized to implement hybrid postMessage: For example, apps may execute JavaScript code to
trigger a message event using the JavaScript execution APIs (likeWebView.loadUrl()). Hence, the
parameters of these APIs should be carefully handled. Additionally, WebView.postWebMessage()
should also be monitored, since it can be used for N→W messaging.
4.3.2 Design Details
Guided by these observations, we designed two main phases in OSV-Hunter containing a number
of sub-modules, as shown in Figure 4.6. In Phase#1, “hybrid postMessage Identification” fills
the semantic gap between the native and web frames, and identifies the implementation of hybrid
postMessage. In Phase#2, “Message Origin Analysis” collects all delivered messages between
message senders and receivers, and performs origin analysis to determine the existence of OSV.
More specifically, given a hybrid app, a fuzzing module “Tester” is first started to 1) trigger
as many WebView components as possible, and 2) attempt to trigger message senders of both the
native and web frames. When a WebView component appears, the loaded HTML/JavaScript code is
analyzed and instrumented to discover potential message senders and receivers in web frames. It
is achieved by the modules “HTML/JS Analysis” and “HTML/JS Instrumentation”. To monitor
all messages cross the native frame, the native code is instrumented by the module “Native Code
Instrumentation”. Then, by collecting and analyzing the information generated by above modules,
message senders and receivers can be identified and linked together, which is done by the module
“Source & Target Link Generation”. Finally, the “Message Content Collection” module dumps
all content of delivered messages, which are further analyzed in “Message Origin Analysis” to
determine the existence of OSV.
We next describe the design details of each sub-module.
4.3.2.1 Hybrid postMessage Identification
In this section, we presented the design details of each sub-module:
• Tester: To trigger WebView and run native code (for triggering message senders in the native
frame), we use a random UI explorer “Monkey” to simulate users’ behaviors [36]. Once WebView
is started, network activities may occur. Then, the pre-defined JavaScript fuzzing code is injected
into network traffic based on our threat model, which is done using the popular proxy tool
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“mitmproxy” [37]. Please note that in order to perform network attacks, network links are crawled
to check if a HTTP link can be navigated. For convenience, we limit the crawl depth as three.
The above injected JavaScript fuzzing code is designed to drive the test onW→N . Usually, the
JavaScript methods that send messages (e.g., window.postMessage()) are called in all kinds of
environments. It is implemented mainly based on existing work, such as the work of Schwenk et
al. [40].
Please note that even when a WebView component is started, Monkey is still kept running. It is
because this is helpful to trigger as much native code as possible, and thus, message senders in
the native frame may be triggered.
• HTML/JS Analysis and Instrumentation: When HTML is going to be loaded in WebView, the
HTML content is analyzed and instrumented as follows. First, the first page of the HTML code
and all JavaScript code are cached in local storage for further instrumentation. Please note that
JavaScript code will be handled by JS Analysis and JS Instrumentation later. Then, all important
remote links in HTML are converted to local links, such as the link specified by the “src” attribute
of the element “<script>”. So that the local instrumented content can be loaded in run-time,
instead. To analyze and instrument the content of nested frames, an extra WebView event handler
implementation of shouldInterceptRequest() is imported to handle the nested frame loading event,
and control the content of nested frames.
JavaScript code is analyzed and instrumented as follows. First, message senders (such as win-
dow.postMessage()) are identified and handled by inserting extra instructions to print necessary
information (like the origin of the web frame that the message sender belongs to), and instrument-
ing the method parameters, such as inserting ID if ID does not exist.
Then, message handlers are processed. To hook a message handler method f , a wrapper function
f ′, which has the same function prototype with f , is defined to replace f . In f ′, all necessary
information is printed, such as the web frame’s origin and the method parameters, and then, f is
called and fed with f ′’s parameters. In this way, the original semantic of the web code is kept. To
track the message content received by f ′, ID is injected.
• Native Code Instrumentation: Native code is instrumented to discover all message sending and
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receiving activities. To discover a message receiver ofW→N , all native functions’ parameters are
checked, which is done by instrumenting the run-time interpreter in Android ART (i.e., DoCall()
in the file “interpreter_common.cc”). If a parameter is a string, its low-level object StringObject
is retrieved for further analysis, such as converting it back to a normal string, and checking if ID
exists.
To discover the message sender of N→W , critical APIs (such as WebView.loadUrl() and We-
bView.postWebMessage()) are monitored, which is done by instrumenting the Android frame-
work code to record the parameters of these APIs. Please note that if the parameters of Web-
View.loadUrl() are JavaScript code, the JavaScript code will be analyzed by the sub-module JS
Analysis and Instrumentation. If postWebMessage() is called, the message content to be sent is
also instrumented by inserting ID.
• Message Source and Target Link Generation: Guided by the insight and observation (Section
4.3), message senders and receivers in both native and web frames can be identified. First, all
log information that is generated by HTML/JS Analysis and Instrumentation, and Native Code
Instrumentation is collected. Then, the log is filtered using the special format of ID. Finally,
message senders and receivers can be linked together by matching ID. Since each ID is unique,
the established links are also unique.
4.3.2.2 Message Origin Analysis
• Message Content Collection: To determine the existence of OSV, the content of all delivered
messages are fully dumped and collected. In the native frame, the content of all related low level
objects (e.g., StringObject) are dumped. In the web frames, the content of all JavaScript variables
is printed. If a variable is an object, all its fields (including inherited fields), and the corresponding
values are logged.
All other critical logs are also gathered, such as the ones containing origin information of message
senders and receivers.
• Vulnerability Determination: OSV can be determined based on the definitions of the four sub-
vulnerabilities (Section 4.2). More specifically, V1 and V4 can be automatically determined by
checking if the origin information is contained in relevant APIs or delivered messages using the
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information collected by the sub-module “Message Content Collection”. However, for V2 and
V3, it is challenging to analyze the origin information, since the native frame does not have an
explicit origin. Hence, manual efforts may be needed in this phase.
4.3.3 Implementation
We implement OSV-Hunter by instrumenting the Android source code (the 6.0 version). All
modules are built from scratch, except HTML/JavaScript analysis and instrumentation. The HTML
analysis and instrumentation module is built based on JSoup 1.10.3, and the JavaScript analysis and
instrumentation module relies on Mozilla Rhino 1.7.7. JSoup and Rhino are written in Java, and
added into WebView as libraries. Please note that Rhino is very powerful, but in OSV-Hunter, we
only statically use it to generate and manipulate AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) of target JavaScript
code, and convert AST back to new JavaScript code.
4.4 Study of Hybrid postMessage and OSV
4.4.1 Data Set
To build an appropriate data set for the evaluation, we crawled 17K most popular free apps from
32 categories (top 540 apps for each category) in Google Play in July 2017. However, not all apps
should be analyzed. For example, some apps do not even use WebView.
Therefore, to reduce the workload, we establish two qualifications to narrow down our data set.
The first one is that apps must contain at least one WebView instance. Thus, we use the keyword
“WebView” on apps’ disassembled code to statically filter apps.
The other qualification is that apps should contain postMessage-related code. To avoid potential
false negatives, both regular and hybrid postMessage should be included. For this purpose, we use
the background knowledge to establish our static filter. An expected app should contain postMessage-
related keywords such as: 1) “postMessage”, which is used to send messages; 2) “WebMessage”,
which is frequently contained in official APIs, such as “WebView.postWebMessage()”; 3) “onmes-
sage”, which is the global message handler; 4) “addEventListener("message"”, which is used to
register message handlers.
As a result, 1,104 apps remain as our data set.
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Vulnerability Name
(App or Framework)
Impacted Apps
/ Total Apps
Example App
Vulnerability Type
ConsequencesNative→Web Web→ Native
V1 V2 V3 V4
Facebook
React Native
43/43
com.altvr.xxx
com.giantfood.xxx
...
✓ ? ✗ ✓
Monitoring Audio, Data Race, Internal Critical
Data Manipulation, ...
Google Print 30/30
com.adobe.xxx
cn.wps.xxx
...
✗ ✓ Denial of Service
Eclipse Source 1/1 com.eclipsesource.xxx ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Sending a message with a source origin not
belonging to itself
WebView’s
postWebMessage()
0/0 ✗ ?
Total Vulnerable Apps
/ Total Apps
74/74
Please note that ✓means the sub-vulnerability exists; ✗means the sub-vulnerability does not exist;
? indicates there are no strong evidences to verify whether the sub-vulnerability exists or not. The cell marked
with the grey color means the communication in that direction is not implemented.
Table 4.2: The Evaluation Result
4.4.2 Results
In our study, we deployed OSV-Hunter in Nexus 5 to identify apps that contain actual hybrid
postMessage implementations. Each app was tested for 10 minutes. Finally, we identified 74 apps
that implemented hybrid postMessage and we also found that all these apps were vulnerable.
The results are summarized in Table 4.2. Several popular third-party frameworks or libraries
(like Facebook React Native, and Google cloud print) suffer from OSV, and may cause serious
consequences, such as remote real-time microphone monitoring, permanent data race, internal
data manipulation, denial of service (DoS) and so on. Furthermore, several high-profile apps are
impacted. For example, the Google cloud print service in Adobe Reader and WPS office may suffer
from DoS attacks due to the OSV.
As shown in Table 4.2, both N→W and W→N are demanded and implemented by devel-
opers. For N→W , it is supported in the React Native framework, the EclipseSource app, and
the WebView official API WebView.postWebMessage(). All the implementations except Web-
View.postWebMessage() suffer from V1, since the target origin of the message to be sent cannot
be specified. All the implementations, including WebView.postWebMessage(), may be impacted
by V2, as the source origin is not well provided in the message receiver. More specifically, in the
React Native framework, the source origin of N→W is “undefined”. It is because a customized
data structure is designed to carry the delivered message. In the data structure, the “data” field is set
to contain the message content. However, another important field “origin” is not defined. Hence,
when a message receiver reads the source origin of a received message, “undefined” is obtained.
Although we did not find a good counter-example to prove the origin “undefined” is wrong for
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the native frame (such as “undefined” may be not unique), “undefined” is meaningless and hard to
manage. As discussed in Section 4.2, such meaningless origins may cause more security issues,
such as CSV. A similar problem is also found in WebView.postWebMessage(), which provides a
meaningless origin (empty string) as the source origin. It is because in the native layer, the internal
implementation of postWebMessage() does not explicitly define the origin of the native frame, and
NULL is used at default. Correspondingly, in the web space, an empty string is treated as the source
origin.
Different from the above implementations, the EclipseSource app provides the source origin.
However, the origin may not be correct. It is because in this app, the JavaScript method par-
ent.postMessage() is hijacked by a JavaScript Bridge, where the origin of the top frame is always
used as the message source origin, even when a message is sent from an iframe.
For W→N , it is implemented in all developers’ hybrid postMessage implementations. This
suggests W→N is highly demanded, and thus the official API WebView.postWebMessage() that
provides the simple functionality does not meet the requirement.
However, allW→N implementations are also impacted by OSV, especially the sub-vulnerability
V4. Note that V3 is not flagged even though the required origin is not transferred. It is because
although in W→N the target origin cannot be specified, it is implied in the message-sending
methods themselves. More specifically, to implement W→N , developers rewrite the JavaScript
method “window.postMessage()” to send a message to the native frame at default. Hence, if the
native frame is unique, the target origin information should be implied in the APIs themselves, since
the native frame is the sole destination. In fact, the native frame is unique. “window.open()” may
create a new native frame, but it does not influence the original native frame’s uniqueness. It is
because the new native frame is totally independent of the original native frame, and web frames
can only communicate with their corresponding native frames.
V4 exists in all implementations. All source origins are lost during message delivery. Hence,
if malicious code is injected into WebView, the malicious code can freely access the internal
functionalities inside the message receiver of the native frame. Section 4.4.4 demonstrates this
sub-vulnerability may introduce serious consequences.
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4.4.3 Findings
From our study results, we have the following findings:
• Developers wrongly assume the content loaded in WebView is trustable: This wrong assumption is
reflected in developers’ implementations. For instance, in N→W , their implementations usually
do not provide an interface to specify the target origin. No matter what origin is loaded in the
target web frame, the message will be delivered. In W→N , when the native frame receives a
message, the source origin of the message is not provided. This indicates that the content loaded
in WebView is fully trusted, which may cause serious consequences.
• The requirement of a feasible hybrid postMessage implementation may be urgent: Regular
postMessage is still very popular in hybrid mobile apps. However, compared with regular
postMessage, a feasible hybrid postMessage implementation is more preferred. For instance, in
many apps,W→N is implemented by rewriting the JavaScript method window.postMessage(),
which breaks the regular postMessage functionality.
• In all web frames, only the main web frame usually has the capability to communicate with the
native frame, but some main web frames are treated as message proxies during message delivery:
Within our data set, we found 73/74 (98.6%) apps only allow the main web frame to exchange
data with the native frame, and 30/74 (40.5%) apps leverage the main web frame as proxies.
• The blended vulnerabilities of CSV and OSV exist in real world apps: 30 apps use the main web
frame as message proxies, where both CSV and OSV exist. The blended vulnerabilities may
result in that existing WebView defense solutions may be fooled.
• The official hybrid postMessage APIs are rarely used in practice: Within our whole dataset,
no apps use the official WebView APIs. Compared with developers’ implementations, the
functionality provided by WebView.postWebMessage() is too simple.
• The communication “W→N” is usually implemented relying on JavaScript Bridge: JavaScript
Bridge opens bridges linking web code with native code. However, as JavaScript Bridge usually
does not carry any origin information, OSV is likely caused. Although there are several solutions
proposed to protect JavaScript Bridge, all are limited in their ability to prevent OSV.
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Figure 4.7: Hybrid postMessage in Facebook React Native
4.4.4 Case Studies
4.4.4.1 Facebook React Native
Facebook React Native is a third-party development framework that allows developers to develop
mobile apps purely in JavaScript. It supports several popular mobile platforms (like Android and
iOS). Thus, the OSV vulnerability impacts all the supported platforms.
The architecture of the React Native framework is shown in Figure 4.7. In run-time, the running
environment is first created. Developers’ JavaScript code “DJ” is parsed and executed by the
embedded generic and powerful JavaScript engine “JavaScriptCore”. Through JavaScriptCore, DJ
can interact with Android, such as creating native UI components, and handling UI events.
WebView (i.e., customized WebView in Figure 4.7) is also available in the React Native frame-
work. To enable it, it is required for DJ to create a WebView object O as the reference. Listing 4.2
illustrates how to create a WebView object in DJ (Line 9), and let WebView to show a remote web
page (Line 13).
1 // A message handler
2 handleMessage(e) {
3 // The message content is saved in e.nativeEvent.data.
4 // However, the source origin is lost.
5 this.webview.postMessage("[native] received a message : " + e.nativeEvent.data);
6 }
7 // Configure UI layout
8 render() {
9 return (<WebView // Create a WebView component ’O’
10 // Enable JavaScript
11 javaScriptEnabled={true}
12 // Load a remote web page in WebView
13 source={{uri: "https://developer.com"}}
14 // Register a message handler
15 onMessage={this.handleMessage}
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16 .../>
17 );
18 }
Listing 4.2: Example Code of Creating aWebViewObject in DJ
In the React Native framework, hybrid postMessage is implemented to allow the communication
between O and the JavaScript code loaded in the native WebView component (for convenience,
we denote the latter JavaScript code as “WJ”). For this purpose, two APIs are added in O : 1)
WebView.postMessage() (Line 5 of Listing 4.2), which sends a message from O to the main web
frame ofWJ ; and 2) WebView.onMessage() (Line 15 and Lines 2-6 of Listing 4.2), which receives
messages from the main web frame ofWJ .
As discussed in Section 4.4.2, the hybrid postMessage implementation of the React Native
framework suffers from OSV. More details are presented as follows.
To support hybrid postMessage, the React Native framework customizes Android WebView,
where the origin information is not carefully handled. More specifically, as shown in “Customized
WebView” of Figure 4.7, when a message is sent from WJ , it first enters the native context (i.e.,
“Native Customization”) through a pre-imported JavaScript Bridge, where the origin information is
lost. Then, the message is delivered to the embedded JavaScript engine, and further forwarded to O.
The key implementation is shown in Listing 4.1. In Customized WebView, the JavaScript
method window.postMessage() is rewritten. So that when window.postMessage() is called inWJ ,
the message is redirected to a pre-defined native function in the JavaScript Bridge “__REACT_-
WEB_VIEW_BRIDGE”. However, during the message delivery, the source origin information is
lost.
1 WebView.loadUrl("javascript:(function () {" +
2 "var event;" +
3 // Carrying message content in the customized data structure
4 "var data = {’data’: " + message_content + "};" +
5 "try {" +
6 // Creating an event
7 "event = new MessageEvent(’message’, data);" +
8 "} catch (e) { ... }" +
9 // Sending the event to message handlers of the main web frame
10 "document.dispatchEvent(event);" +
11 "})();")
Listing 4.3: SendingMessages to theMain Frame ThroughWebView.loadUrl() in the Native Context
To implement sending a message in the opposite direction, the code shown in Listing 4.3 is used.
The message content to be sent is wrapped in a message event (Lines 3-6), and then is dispatched to
message handlers in the main web frame (Line 12). Since the message origin is not defined in the
61
event wrapper, “undefined” appears as the source origin. More importantly, the implementation
cannot ensure the code is executed in the correct context (e.g., the target origin may not be right).
Because of the OSV problem, adversaries may be able to send messages to message receivers to
access the internal functionalities, or play as message receivers to monitor sensitive information
contained in messages. com.altvr.xxx and com.giantfood.xxx are two good examples to demonstrate
the problems:
• Case#1 com.altvr.xxx: It is designed for VR (Virtual Reality) device management. Users can
create events (such as party, concert, and conference) and let others join in them. In addition,
even though there are no VR devices, the app can still launch 2-D mode, which is available for
most phones.
1 window.postMessage(
2 ’{’ +
3 ’"method":"enterSpaceForceVR",’ +
4 ’"args":{’ +
5 ’"Url":"<event_url>"’ +
6 ’}, ...’ +
7 ’}’)
Listing 4.4: Example Attack Code to Let Apps Forcely Join Any Events
By leveraging OSV, malicious code injected into WebView can freely access the functionality
inside the message receiver of O (i.e., WebView.onMessage()). As the example attack code
(Listing 4.4) shows, adversaries can call the method “enterSpaceForceVR” (Line 3) to let the
app silently and forcibly join any events specified by adversaries (i.e., “Url” in Line 5). If the
microphone is enabled, adversaries may be able to remotely monitor the microphone.
Hence, a feasible attack scenario for silently monitoring the microphone is that an attacker first
logs in developers’ website to create an event, and gets a URL of the created event. Then, the
attacker joins the event to wait for victims in advance. After that, the attacker injects crafted
malicious code into the victim’s WebView through an embedded third-party JavaScript library.
Next, the malicious code triggers hybrid postMessage and calls the “enterSpaceForceVR” method
with the pre-obtained event URL as the parameter. After that, the app silently joins in the event
controlled by the attacker. Finally, the attacker may start to monitor the victim’s microphone.
Furthermore, the above attack code may also cause data race. When the app is opened, the app
usually takes a long time for initialization, especially when the microphone is enabled. At that
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period, if the attack code shown in Listing 4.4 is injected and executed, a data race occurs. In
our test, the data race can be stably triggered. When a third-party JavaScript lib is fetched by the
app’s WebView, adversaries can immediately inject and run attack code. Then, the data race can
be triggered. In addition, the influence of the data race is continuous, and can only be avoided by
totally cleaning user data, or re-installing the app.
The cause of data race is that once the microphone is enabled, a flag object will be initialized
when the app is opened. Before the flag object’s initialization, if the attack code is executed, an
exception will be triggered and the app will be crashed.
In the above two attacks, the functionalities inside the message receiver of O can be fully
leveraged. It is because due to OSV, the React Native framework does not provide any source
origin information for validation.
The implementation of the app’s message receiver is shown in Listing 4.5. When a message
is received, the message content is retrieved and parsed (Line 5). Then, the message receiver
executes an arbitrary method whose name and arguments are determined by the fields “method”
and “args” of the received message (Lines 9). Finally, the execution result “r” is returned through
WebView.postMessage() (Line 13).
1 // e is a WebView object in O
2 // Registering a message handler
3 e.onMessage = function(t) {
4 // Reading message content to a
5 var a = JSON.parse(t.nativeEvent.data);
6 ...
7
8 // Executing an arbitrary method in the WebView object e
9 r = e[a.method](a.args);
10 ...
11
12 // Returning the execution result to WJ
13 e.refs.wv.postMessage(JSON.stringify({..., value: r, ...}));
14 }),
Listing 4.5: Code Snippet of onMessage() in Case1
• Case#2 com.giantfood.xxx: It is a food shopping management app. The operation on users’ cart
(i.e., the shopping list) relies on data exchange over hybrid postMessage. InWJ → O, the main
frame ofWJ can send a command to ask for corresponding actions, such as opening and editing
cart, and adding and removing items to or from the cart.
Hence, a feasible attack scenario is that an attacker injects malicious code through an HTTP link,
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and then, sends messages throughWJ → O to manipulate the app’s internal data.
The implementation of the message receiver of O is shown in Listing 4.6. When a message is
received, its content is directly parsed and dispatched to the corresponding event handler. Hence,
if the content of the transferred message is equal to the values in “SHOPPING_LIST”, all internal
functionalities can be accessed.
1 // The message receiver in O ’WebView.onMessage()’
2 key: "onMessage",
3 value: function(e) {
4 // Dispatch events based on the message content
5 // However, the message’ source origin is not provided for validation
6 switch ((e.nativeEvent.data)) {
7 case SHOPPING_LIST.OPEN:
8 // Dispatch the event
9 (0, N.tagEvent)(SHOPPING_LIST.OPEN);
10 break;
11 case SHOPPING_LIST.EDIT: ...
12 ...
Listing 4.6: Code Snippet of onMessage() in Case2
4.4.4.2 Google Cloud Print
The Google cloud print library is designed to provide the cloud print service. It is very popular,
and available in many high-profile documentation management apps. The library is usually started
by an inter-component communication (i.e., Intent) message that carries the details of the document
to be printed (such as file URI and type). Then, it opens a WebView component to load a remote
print web page. As shown in Listing 4.7, when the web page is fully loaded (Line 1), a message
handler is registered in the native context (Line 4). The message handler works as the message proxy
to forward all received messages to the native layer (Lines 7-9). It is done by calling a JavaScript
Bridge (Line 8).
1 public void onPageFinished(WebView view, String url) { ...
2 webView.loadUrl("javascript:" +
3 // Registering a message handler as message proxy
4 "window.addEventListener(" +
5 "’message’," +
6 // Forwarding all received message content to the native frame
7 "function(evt) {" + // CSV exists
8 " window." + JS_INTERFACE + ".onPostMessage(evt.data)" +
9 "}, " +
10 "false" +
11 ")");
12 }
Listing 4.7: The Source Code of Registering aMessageHandler in Google Print
Please note that although a JavaScript Bridge is used in the message handler of the main web
frame, we still count the JavaScript Bridge as part of the implementation of hybrid postMessage.
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API Context Role API Description
Web Message Sender void postMessageToNativeFrame(String msg) Sending msg to the native frame
Native
Message Sender void postMessageToMainFrame(String msg, Uri targetOrigin)
Sending msg to the main web frame whose origin
is targetOrigin
Message Receiver void receiveMessageFromMainFrame(Callback callback)
Registering a callback function to receive messages
from the main web frame
Table 4.3: OSV-Free APIs
It is because in this scenario, the native function (“onPostMessage()”) of the JavaScript Bridge
is the essential message receiver that handles the received message content. It is also reflected in
its implementation, which is shown in Listing 4.8. In the native function, the message content is
handled and parsed. If it is equal to a constant value, which is saved in the variable “CLOSE_-
POST_MESSAGE_NAME”, the service will be finished.
1 public void onPostMessage(String message) {
2 // CLOSE_POST_MESSAGE_NAME is a constant string
3 if (message.startsWith(CLOSE_POST_MESSAGE_NAME)) {
4 finish();
5 }
6 }
Listing 4.8: Source Code of theMessageHandler in Google Print
The above implementation of W→N suffers from V4, since the source origin is lost. As a
result, DoS may be caused, considering the following situations: 1) based on our URL crawler, the
web page loaded in WebView contains an HTTP link, which may be leveraged to inject malicious
code; 2) adversaries can leverage hybrid postMessage to send a special message to the native
frame to stop the service. If the content of the sent message is equal to the value of the variable
“CLOSE_POST_MESSAGE_NAME”, DoS may be caused.
In addition, the message handler of the main frame is also a message proxy. However, CSV
exists, which indicates that the scenario about the blended attacks on OSV and CSV is feasible
(Figure 4.4).
4.5 The Mitigation Solution : OSV-Free APIs
4.5.1 Goals
Motivated by our study result, we aim to design safe hybrid postMessage APIs. The new APIs
should achieve the following goals:
• Meeting the development requirements: The new APIs should provide both N→W andW→N
functionalities.
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• Secure: The APIs should not be affected by OSV.
• Fast: The APIs should only introduce low overhead.
• Easy to use: The APIs should be easily applied and integrated.
• Generic: The APIs should be resilient to the notorious Android fragmentation problem, and
support as many devices as possible.
4.5.2 Overview
Guided by the above goals, we design the OSV-Free APIs. To avoid potential vulnerabilities,
such as V2, we explicitly define the origin of the native frame as “nativeframe”. To the best of our
knowledge, the origin is meaningful and unique. Please note that the origin is configurable. If an
error is found in the origin, the origin can be changed by developers or updated by users.
Similar to existing hybrid postMessage implementations (Section 4.4.3), we also only allow the
main web frame to communicate with the native frame. Moreover, to avoid the weakness of existing
security solutions, the APIs offer fine-grained origin information and rich hints for building the
whole picture of the message delivery, which is helpful to let developers be aware of the blended
attacks on OSV and CSV.
As a result, we propose three new hybrid postMessage APIs, called OSV-Free, to allow the
secure, fast and generic messaging between the native frame and the main web frame. The APIs are
listed in Table 4.3, and more design details are discussed as follows.
In the native frame, the new API postMessageToMainFrame() is proposed to allow the native
frame to send messages to the main web frame. Since the API can specify the target origin and
ensure only the target origin can receive messages, the sub-type vulnerability V1 is eliminated.
Correspondingly, in the main web frame, the message handlers can receive messages from the native
frame as normal. Since the meaningful and unique source origin “nativeframe” is provided, V2 is
also eliminated.
In the main web frame, the new JavaScript method postMessageToNativeFrame() is created.
Since the native frame is the sole destination, the target origin is already implied in the API itself,
and thus V3 is eliminated. In the native frame, to receive messages from the main web frame,
a callback function is registered in advance through the API receiveMessageFromMainFrame().
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Then, when a message arrives, the callback function is called to handle it with multiple level origin
information, so that it can conduct the fine-grained validation. Therefore, V4 is also eliminated.
1 public class Callback {
2 public void onMessage(
3 String frameOrigin,
4 String scriptOrigin,
5 boolean isProxyInvolved,
6 String data);
7 }
Listing 4.9: The Prototype of onMessage
Listing 4.9 shows the prototype of the native callback function “onMessage”. When a message
is received by the callback function, three levels of origin information is provided so that the
callback function can perform validation in a fine-grained way, and also obtain hints about the whole
picture of the message delivery process. More specifically, the first provided origin “frameOrigin”
indicates the origin of main web frame; the second origin “scriptOrigin” provides the origin of the
embedded script, where the JavaScript method that sends the message is located; the third variable
flag “isProxyInvolved” indicates whether the main web frame is forwarding a message as a proxy.
If the flag is true, the scenario similar to what is shown in Figure 4.4 is faced. Hence, developers
should carefully handle this situation.
Furthermore, OSV-Free also brings benefits to existing defense solutions for CSV (“D1”) and
defense solutions for WebView (“D2”). More specifically, OSV-Free makes D1 effective again,
since it provides required source origins. OSV-Free also makes up the deficiency ofD2 by providing
multiple level origin information. Thus, D2 can also offer fine-grained security enforcement and
also be aware of the blended attacks on CSV and OSV.
4.5.3 Design and Implementation
The key observation behind OSV-Free is that in Android 5+, the declaration and implementation
of WebView’s interfaces are separated. The implementation is placed in a standalone library, which
is self-managed and self-updated. Hence, we mainly implement OSV-Free by instrumenting the
above library, which brings benefits of easy upgrade and minimal modification on the Android
source code.
In Android, users can select a browser provider as the library. Currently, Chromium [41] is the
default provider. Roughly, Chromium consists of three modules : 1) content, which links Android
WebView with the render module together; 2) render, which is responsible to handle rendering
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Figure 4.8: OSV-Free’s Design
tasks and interact with the JavaScript engine V8; 3) V8, which is a open-source JavaScript engine
developed by Google.
OSV-Free’s design is shown in Figure 4.8. OSV-Free mainly consists of two parts : OSV-Free
WebView and Customized Chromium Provider. OSV-Free WebView is a WebView wrapper that
declares the native APIs postMessageToMainFrame() and receiveMessageFromMainFrame(), while
Customized Chromium Provider provides the essential implementations of the above two native
APIs. For the remaining JavaScript method postMessageToNativeFrame(), Customized Chromium
Provider can automatically enable it in the main web frame, when a callback function is registered
through the native API receiveMessageFromMainFrame(). Please note that OSV-Free WebView
should be integrated into vulnerable apps to replace the original WebView.
To implement OSV-Free, Chromium’s content and render modules are instrumented for each
provided API as follows.
4.5.3.1 postMessageToMainFrame()
This API is implemented by reusing existing methods. When the API is called, the customized
content module is started, and then an internal API, called postMessageToFrame(), is invoked to
handle the whole task of the N→W message.
4.5.3.2 receiveMessageFromMainFrame() and postMessageToNativeFrame()
receiveMessageFromMainFrame() is implemented by instrumenting the content and render
modules. When the API is called, the content module is entered, where the API’s parameter is
cached, parsed, and checked to make sure the format is correct and its internal callback function is
not empty. Then, a message is sent to the render module to notify that a callback function is being
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registered. After that, the render module reads the context of V8, and binds a pre-defined callback
function f to V8 as “postMessageToNativeFrame()”.
In run-time, when postMessageToNativeFrame() is called in the main web frame, f follows.
Then, in f , multiple level origin information is collected. The origin of the main web frame
“frameOrigin” is obtained by identifying the mainframe object in the frame tree and retrieving the last-
loaded URL from the mainframe object. It can be done by calling “frame_tree()->GetMainFrame()-
>last_committed_url().GetOrigin().spec()”. The origin of the nested script “ScriptOrigin” can be
retrieved from the last node of the frame stack (i.e., v8::StackTrace::CurrentStackTrace()). The
flag “isProxyInvolved” is configured by checking if a message handler is called, which is done
by analyzing the above frame stack. Currently, only the global message handler “onmessage” is
supported. We leave supporting other message handlers as our future work.
Later, the render module packs all above origin information together with the message content
and sends them to the content module. Finally, developers’ callback function “Callback.onMessage()”
is called with multiple level origin information and the message content.
4.5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present our evaluation result of OSV-Free on its performance, effectiveness,
and compatibility. In the end, we also demonstrate that OSV-Free is easy to use.
4.5.4.1 Performance
To evaluate OSV-Free’s performance, we develop a simple app to call the OSV-Free APIs. We
found that OSV-Free was fast, and only used ~2 milliseconds. The details are shown in Table 4.4.
More specifically, we record the starting and ending time of the API execution, and then compute
the time difference as the cost. However, we found it was challenging to record the time in two
different platforms. To mitigate the problem, we select the method “Date.getTime()”, which is
available in both web and native platforms, and also record the time using the same standard. The
method returns the milliseconds since midnight 01 January 1970 UTC.
4.5.4.2 Effectiveness
To check OSV-Free’s effectiveness, we use OSV-Free to patch two vulnerable frameworks: the
Facebook React Native framework and the Google Print lib. We found that the vulnerabilities could
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Table 4.4: The Performance of OSV-Free APIs
Target Item APIs
Average
Cost Time
(milliseconds)
The official API
(N→W )
postWebMessage() 2.63
OSV-FreeN→W postMessageToMainFrame() 2.23
OSV-FreeW→N
postMessageToNativeFrame→
receiveMessageFromMainFrame()
2.08
be eliminated. In N→W , only the specified target origin can receive the message. When a message
is received, its source origin is the native frame’s origin. InW→N , the target origin is implied in
the function postMessageToNativeFrame(), while the source origin of the received message provides
rich and correct origins.
4.5.4.3 Compatibility
To confirm OSV-Free’s compatibility, we installed and successfully verified OSV-Free APIs
in several popular Android versions (5.0+). These tested versions collectively occupy ~80%
distribution of the Android market [23].
4.5.4.4 Case Study : Patching the Facebook React Native Framework
To demonstrate OSV-Free is easy to use, we apply OSV-Free to patch the Facebook React Native
framework (version 46). We found only a few minutes were used in the process. Our patching code
is mainly located in the class ReactWebViewManager. More details are shown as follows.
First, we import the OSV-Free WebView class into the React Native framework. To make
it effective, we make the framework’s own customized WebView (i.e., ReactWebView) inherit
OSV-Free WebView.
Then, the communication “W→N” is enhanced. Initially, it is implemented based on a
JavaScript Bridge, which is enabled by calling two Java methods setMessagingEnabled() and
linkBridge(). Instead, in its enhanced implementation, our API postMessageToNativeFrame() is
used. To enable postMessageToNativeFrame(), in the above two Java methods, the Java method re-
ceiveMessageFromMainFrame() is called instead. Please note that a callback function is pre-defined
as the parameter of receiveMessageFromMainFrame() to receive messages from web code. Once
a message is received, the received message content and multiple-level source origin information
are sent to the JavaScript engine JavaScriptCore (by calling onMessage()), and finally forwarded to
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developers’ JavaScript code.
Lastly, the communication “N→W ” is also improved. It is done by instrumenting the native
method receiveCommand(). When a command “COMMAND_POST_MESSAGE” is received for
sending a message from the native frame to the main web frame, postMessageToMainFrame() is
used instead.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 OSV-Hunter’s goal
Although some hybrid postMessage APIs are implemented based on JavaScript Bridge, OSV-
Hunter is not designed to analyze JavaScript Bridge. Instead, it is used to vet hybrid postMessage
against OSV.
4.6.2 OSV-Hunter’s weakness
As a dynamic test tool, OSV-Hunter may have false negatives. For example, OSV-Hunter uses
the random test tool “Monkey” to trigger WebView. However, some apps’ WebView can only be
shown when preconditions are satisfied. For example, users must finish login, or a pdf file must
exist in local storage in advance. To mitigate the problem, we assume all the preconditions are
satisfied before our test.
4.6.3 Other ways to defend against V4
Developers may retrieve the origin of the main frame through other ways, such as the native
API WebV iew.getUrl(), which provide the URL for the current page. However, the API may
fail and return NULL [42]. Developers may also maintain the status of current URL using event
handlers [42]. However, this approach may also fail, since event handlers may not be successfully
triggered [43].
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we study hybrid postMessage. We show in the context of WebView, regular
postMessage does not meet the requirements. Thus, mobile app developers extend it as hybrid
postMessage, which allows cross-platform communication. However, this extended postMessage
cannot follow the security model defined for regular postMessage, which causes serious security
issues. We develop novel detection and defense solutions to detect and defend against the security
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issues.
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5. STUDYING AND PROTECTING IFRAMES/POPUPS*
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Motivation
In the web platform, iframes/popups are frequently used, but also often the root cause of
several critical security issues (e.g., frame hijacking [3] and clickjacking [4, 5]). In past years, in
regular browsers, these security issues have been well studied, and a variety of mature iframe/popup
protection solutions (e.g., Same Origin Policy (SOP) [6], HTML5 iframe sandbox [7], and navigation
policies [3]) have been deployed.
5.1.2 Inconsistencies Between Browsers and WebView
However, in WebView, a totally different working environment is provided for iframes/popups,
due to WebView’s own programming and UI features. Although these features improve app
performance and user experience, they extensively impact iframe/popup behaviors and introduce
serious security concerns. For example, WebView enables several programming APIs, such as
Settings (Figure 1.1), to help developers customize iframe/popup behaviors. When these APIs are
used, it is unclear whether existing iframe/popup protection solutions are still effective.
Furthermore, WebView UI is designed in a simple style (Figure 5.1) that only one UI area for
rendering web content is provided. Due to the lack of the address bar, it is difficult for users to
learn what web content is being loaded; due to the lack of the tab bars, it is unknown how multiple
WebView UI instances (WUIs) are managed. Therefore, if an iframe/popup has abilities to secretly
navigate the main frame (the top frame) or put their own WUI to the foremost position, serious
consequences may be caused (e.g., phishing attacks).
Consider the scenario shown in Figure 5.2 and 5.3. The Huntington banking app (one million+
downloads) uses WebView to help users reset passwords (Figure 5.2-a,b). Inside WebView, the main
frame contains an iframe for isolatedly loading untrusted third-party tracking content (Figure 5.3).
* Part of this chapter is reprinted with the permission from “Iframes/Popups Are Dangerous in Mobile WebView:
Studying and Mitigating Differential Context Vulnerabilities”, Guangliang Yang, Jeff Huang, and Guofei Gu. In
Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium (Security’19).
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Table 5.1: A Summary of Differential Context Vulnerabilities (DCV)
Critical Features
& Behaviors
Different Contexts
Attacks Explanations Consequences
Browsers WebView
Main-Frame
Creation
Address
Bar
Java APIs Origin Hiding Attack
Special common origins
(e.g., null) Of Main-Frame
Sensitive functionalities
behind postMessage and
JavaScript Bridges can be
leveraged, which may
cause the leakage of
sensitive information (e.g.,
location), and risky access
on Hardware (e.g., camera
and microphone)
Management of
new popups
Table Bar
Android
Frameworks
WUI overlap attack No protection on the WUI
rendering sequence
Phishing attacks
WUI closure attack
Main-Frame
Navigation
Address
Bar
Java APIs
Traditional navigation
based attack
Permissive navigation
policies
Privileged navigation
attack
Harmful conflict between
WebView Customizations
and web APIs
However, if the untrusted web content inside the iframe obtains the ability of stealthily redirecting
the main frame to a fake website (Figure 5.2-c), serious security risks are posed. For example, users’
personal and bank account information may be stolen, and further financial losses may also be
caused.
5.1.3 Differential Context Vulnerabilities (DCV)
Motivated by above security concerns, we conduct the first study on the security of iframe/popup
behaviors in the context of Android WebView. Please note that we use the term “context” to refer to
a web environment that includes GUI elements (e.g., the address and tab bars), corresponding web
management APIs (e.g., settings APIs in WebView), and security policies (e.g., SOP and navigation
policies).
As a consequence, our study uncovers a novel class of vulnerabilities and design flaws in
WebView. To demonstrate the security implications and impacts of the vulnerabilities, we develop
several corresponding concrete attacks. More specifically, we find that these vulnerabilities are
rooted in the inconsistencies between differential contexts of regular browsers and WebView. The
inconsistencies are summarized in Table 5.1. Several critical we features and behaviors (e.g.,
main-frame creation, popup creation, main-frame navigation) are involved. They are harmless or
even safe in the context of regular browsers, but become risky and dangerous in the context of
WebView. We illustrate that by triggering and leveraging these differential features and behaviors,
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an untrusted iframe/popup inside WebView can easily obtain unexpected and risky privileges and
abilities:
• Origin-Hiding: hiding the origin when 1) breaking the integrity of web messaging (i.e., postMes-
sage) [8], which allows the communication between mutually distrusted web frames; and 2)
secretly accessing web-mobile bridges [9], which link the web layer and the mobile or native
layer (e.g., Java for Android) together (Figure 1.1);
Existing work has shown that postMessage’s message receivers [18, 19] and web-mobile bridges
[9, 10, 44] often carry sensitive functionalities, which can be further stealthily accessed by the
untrusted iframe/popup. As a result, sensitive information (e.g., GPS location) may be stolen, and
important hardware (e.g., camera and microphone) may be unauthorizedly accessed.
• WebView UI Redressing: performing phishing attacks by overlapping the foremost benign WUI
with an untrusted WUI;
• (Privileged) Main-Frame Navigation: freely redirecting the main frame to a fake website.
Moreover, we examine the effectiveness of existing protection solutions, which include not only
the solutions designed for regular browsers, but also the solutions proposed for Android UI and
WebView. We find that these solutions are ineffective to defend against associated attacks:
• For origin-hiding attacks, existing defense solutions for postMessage [3, 18–20] and web-mobile
bridges [9,10,15–17] usually provide security enforcement relying on origin validation. However,
unfortunately, the key origin information of the untrusted iframe/popup can be hidden during
attacks, which leads to the bypass of the security enforcement.
• For WUI redressing attacks, they are similar to Android UI redressing attacks [45–47]. However,
the associated Android UI protection solutions (e.g., [48, 49]) are circumscribed to prevent WUI
addressing attacks. This is mainly because that these protections work by monitoring exceptional
Android UI state changes between different apps, while the WUI state change occurs within an
app during attacks.
• For main-frame navigation attacks, one related solution is the iframe sandbox security mechanism,
which can effectively limit the navigation capability of an arbitrary iframe. However, through DCV
attacks, an untrusted iframe can still break the above limitation and cause privilege escalation.
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• Network attacks: When the sub-frames use HTTP network, attackers may perform man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks to inject attack code into the sub-frames, and then launch DCV attacks.
Although HTTPS have been widely adopted in modern web apps, there is still much legacy code
using HTTP.
This scenario is feasible, especially considering many public unsafe WIFI hotspots are avail-
able [34]. A possible scenario example is that attackers may set up a free WIFI hotspot in a
crowded place. Nearby smartphone users may use this WIFI. If these users open vulnerable apps
(e.g.,Facebook and skype) and click arbitrary web links, apps’ WebView may load these links.
If the loaded web content embeds iframes/popups using unsafe network channels (e.g., HTTP),
attackers may inject malicious code into the iframes/popups and launch attacks.
• Web attacks: The inclusion of third-party content usually introduces security implications [51,52].
Hence, we assume web attackers may be the owner of a third-party domain (e.g., ads.com)
severing an embedded untrusted iframe/popup. Our empirical study on a set of popular hybrid
apps and mobile websites shows iframes/popups are frequently used to load third-party content,
especially third-party advertising and tracking content. Existing work has demonstrated that third-
party advertising [53,54] and tracking [55–59] services often causes serious security concerns.
More than that, as figured out by existing work [60,61], a third-party iframe may even directly
work as a malicious entry point for malware.
This scenario is also possible in practice. For example, as demonstrated in prior work (e.g., [51]),
some domains may expire, which still commonly occurs in recent years. Attackers may register
and get the control of these domains. If these domains are embedded by some websites in
iframes/popups, attackers may broadcast these websites in Facebook to lure users to access
them. When these websites are opened in the corresponding vulnerable apps (e.g., Facebook
or Facebook Messenger), the domains controlled by attackers are accessed. Attackers obtain
chances to inject malicious code and launch attacks.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.4, considering the security of the popup behavior is one
of our research objectives, we also assume the popup-creation ability of an iframe/popup is enabled
in its sandbox attribute.
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5.3 Differential Context Vulnerabilities
In this section, we mainly focus on DCV, and also explain why existing defense solutions are
ineffective to prevent DCV attacks. We first show the overview of our security study, and then
present the details of each vulnerability. Last, we discuss the advantages of DCV attacks over
existing attacks, also with the analysis of the root causes of DCV.
5.3.1 Study Overview
Guided by the inconsistencies between regular browsers and WebView, our security study of
iframe/popup behaviors is mainly concerned with the following three dimensions:
• The application of common origins: WebView content initialization APIs may create the main
frame with common origins, such as “file://” and “null”. For example, the invocation
WebView.loadurl(’file:///android_asset/index.html’)
can load a local file with the origin “file://”, while WebView.loadData() and WebView .loadData
WithBaseURL() may create a main frame to load web data with the “null” origin.
However, these common origins are not unique for the main frame, and may be reproduced by
untrusted iframes/popups in their inside sub-frames for launching attacks. More specifically, if an
untrusted sub-frame can generate a new nested sub-frame “Fnested” with above common origins,
the untrusted sub-frame may place its essential attack code inside Fnested to make risky operations,
which are aimed to attack all potential objectives, including the main frame, other sub-frames,
or WebView itself. In the attack process, the victims may validate the operations by checking
the corresponding origins. However, the origin information they can obtain is Fnested’s origin,
rather than the real origin (i.e., the origin of the untrusted sub-frame). Considering Fnested have
the same origin as the main frame, the origin validation process fails. Finally, the victims may
treat untrusted operations as benign operations and handled them as usual.
Our study confirms that a sub-frame is not allowed to generate a new sub-frame with the “file://”
origin, due to built-in security policies (Section 2.4). However, a nested sub-frame with a “null”
origin can still be generated by using the data scheme URL (e.g., <iframe src="data://..."), which
is frequently used to load simple HTML code (such as images) in the web platform. Although
SOP can prevent cross-frame scripting between two “null” origins (e.g., the main frame and
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Fnested), untrusted sub-frames can still leverage the “null” origin to make several nefarious actions
(Section 5.3.2).
• Concise WebView UI design: WebView’s UI design causes security risks that untrusted iframes/pop-
ups may perform phishing attacks, if they have the abilities of 1) manipulating the rendering order
of multiple WUIs; 2) navigating the main frame. To verify the former potential ability, we first
conduct an empirical study on a set of popular hybrid apps. This study is aimed to understand
how WUIs are managed in practice. We find Android manages multiple WUIs, and when a popup
is created, Android place its WUI behind current WUI at default.
This WUI management strategy seems safe. However, it does not meet app development re-
quirements. Instead, some apps manage WUIs by themselves, which is yet error-prone due to
the design flaws of the WebView event handler system (Section 5.3.6). As a result, the crucial
ability of manipulating the WUI rendering order is exposed (Section 5.3.3.1). Thus, an untrusted
iframe/popup can get the ability of overlapping begin WUIs with its own WUI. Our study also
shows that even when Android’s default WUI management strategy is adopted, it is still possible
for untrusted iframes/popups to change the WUI rendering order by combining WUI creation and
closure operations (Section 5.3.3.2).
Second, to confirm the latter potential navigation ability, we study the navigation policies of
WebView. We find WebView inherits permissive navigation policies from Chrome/Chromium.
These navigation policies have been well investigated in the context of regular browsers (Section
2.4), but rarely scrutinized in the context of WebView. These navigation policies allow an
untrusted sub-frame to navigate the main frame. Due to the lack of the address bar, the navigation
based attack is stealthier and more powerful in the context of WebView (Section 5.3.4.1).
Note that the above navigation can be disabled by iframe sandbox (Section 2.4). But considering
iframe sandbox is hardly used in practice, the attack is still prevalent and has negative security
impacts in real-world hybrid apps. This is also verified in our evaluation (Section 5.5.2).
• WebView programming features: WebView’s programming features may impact the effective-
ness of existing defense solutions. To verify it, we extensively test these protection solutions’
performance, when different programming features are enabled. Consequently, we identify a
critical conflict between WebView programming features and web popup-creation manners. By
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Figure 5.5: Attacking Web Messaging
leveraging this conflict, untrusted iframes/popups can perform privileged main-frame navigation
attacks, even when this sub-frame’s navigation capability is disabled by iframe sandbox (Section
5.3.4.2).
5.3.2 Origin Hiding Attacks
As introduced in Section 5.3.1, in the context of WebView, security risks are introduced that
untrusted iframes/popups may leverage the “null” origin (created through the data scheme URL)
to hide their own origins while making stealthy risky actions. In this section, we introduce two
extended attacks: attacking web messaging integrity (Section 5.3.2.1) and stealthily accessing
web-mobile bridges (Section 5.3.2.2).
5.3.2.1 Attacking Web Messaging
Figure 5.5 shows an attack scenario for web messaging. Assume the main frame whose origin is
“null” sends web messages to a benign victim sub-frame. Meanwhile, the main frame also contains
an untrusted sub-frame. If the untrusted sub-frame spawns a new nested sub-frame Fnested with the
“null” origin, and let Fnested send a fake message to the victim sub-frame, the victim sub-frame may
be fooled.
As shown in Listing 5.1, the victim sub-frame may validate the origin of the received message
to ensure the message is from an authorized frame. However, this may not still recognize the
fake message because the fake message has the same origin as the main frame. As a result, the
victim sub-frame may handle the message as normal. If the victim sub-frame carries sensitive
functionalities, these functionalities may be leveraged, and serious consequences may be caused.
1 // Message Handler
2 onmessage = function (e) {
3 // Validating the message source origin
4 if (e.origin == "null") { // From main frame?
5 // Making sensitive actions here
6 }
Listing 5.1: Validating theMessageOrigin in the Victim Sub-frame
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Figure 5.6: Freely Accessing Web-Mobile Bridges
In addition to the above origin validation based protection, the above attack cannot also be
prevented by other defense solutions, such as [3, 18–20], because it is challenging for them to
distinguish between the main frame and Fnested.
5.3.2.2 Accessing Web-Mobile Bridges
As shown in Figure 5.6, the security risks are also posed that untrusted iframes/popups can
also secretly access web-mobile bridges by leveraging the “null” origin (Listing 5.2), but without
being blocked by existing defense solutions. This is because existing defense solutions are coarse-
grained, and the origin they can obtain is Fnested’s (i.e., “null”), rather than the origin of the untrusted
iframes/popups. Hence, they would approve the untrusted operation.
To verify the attacks, we develop two proof-of-concept (POC) apps that can launch the attacks.
Then, we test their performance when the-state-of-the-art protection solution “NoFrak” [9] and
“Draco” [10] are enforced respectively. NoFrak extends SOP to the native layer of a third-party
development framework, while Draco implements the access control in WebView. In the first
POC app, we use the newest version of the popular third-party framework “Apache Cordova” and
instrument the plugin manager to implement NoFrak. In the second POC app, we implement
Draco’s prototype system which is implemented in the WebView lib [10]. In both POC apps, we
find that untrusted accesses by DCV attacks on web-mobile bridges, especially JavaScript bridges,
cannot be prevented.
1 // Creating a nested sub-frame with the data scheme URL
2 var ifrm = document.createElement(’iframe’);
3 // Triggering onJsAlert()
4 ifrm.setAttribute(’src’, ’data:text/html;charset=UTF-8,<html>...<script>alert(\I am
the main frame\’, \’*\’)</’ + ’script>’...
5 document.body.appendChild(ifrm);
Listing 5.2: Accessing the Event Handler onJsAlert() in the Untrusted Iframe/Popup
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triggering a popup-creation event, and letting the created WUI load fake web content and overlap
the benign WUI. Due to the lack of the address and tab bars, this risky popup-creation operation
may be hardly noticed by users. As shown in Listing 5.4, the overlap attack can be easily set up in
practice.
1 // Using HTML Code
2 <a href="https://attacker.com" target="_blank" ...
3 // or Calling JavaScript code
4 window.open("https://attacker.com", "_blank" ...)
Listing 5.4: Exploit Code of theWUIOverlapAttack and the PrivilegedNavigationAttack (Table 5.1)
We note that the key API name “addView” also appears in existing work on Android UI
redressing attacks such as [47]. However, these APIs are totally different. In existing work,
“addView” means “WindowManager.addView()”, which is used to change UI layout between
different apps. In this dissertation, “addView” means “ViewGroup.addView()”, which is used to
change a specific UI layout inside an app. To our knowledge, we are the first to discuss the security
risk of the latter API.
5.3.3.2 WebView UI Closure Attack
When apps use the default Android WUI management strategy, it is still possible for an untrusted
iframe/popup to change the WUI rendering order (Section 5.3.1). As shown in Figure 5.7-b, the
untrusted iframe/popup may first create a new popup window, whose corresponding WUI is placed
behind current benign WUI. Then, the untrusted code triggers the window-closure event, which is
handled by the event handler “onCloseWindow()”. If the event handler is vulnerable and removes
the foremost benign WUI (Line 8 in Listing 5.5) from the WUI rendering order, the former untrusted
WUI appears instead and phishing attacks may occur. Similar to the WUI overlap attack, due to the
lack of the address and tab bars, such attacks are stealthy, and can be easily launched in practice
(e.g., using the code in Listing 5.6).
1 // Customizing onCloseWindow() to enable WebView UI closure
2 public void onCloseWindow(WebView window) {
3 super.onCloseWindow(window);
4 // Destroying the WebView UI being closed
5 ...
6
7 // Removing the WebView UI being closed from current view layout
8 myRootWebViewLayout.removeView(window);
9 }
Listing 5.5: Vulnerable onCloseWindow()
85
1 // Creating a new WebView UI
2 window.open("https://attacker.com", "_blank" ...)
3 // Closing current WebView UI
4 window.close()
Listing 5.6: Exploit Code of theWUIClosure Attack
We note that WebView UI redressing attacks cannot be defended by existing Android UI protection
solutions. These two UI redressing attacks are different. Android UI redressing is performed
between different apps, while WebView UI redressing occurs within one app.
5.3.4 Main-Frame Navigation Attacks
5.3.4.1 Traditional Navigation Attack
Untrusted iframes/popups can leverage traditional navigation policies (Section 2.4) to launch
phishing attacks (e.g., using the code in Listing 5.7 to perform phishing attacks), when their
navigation capabilities are not disabled. Due to the lack of URL indicators (e.g., the address bar),
the attack is stealthier and may be hardly noticed by users.
1 // Using HTML Code
2 <a href="https://attacker.com" target="_top" ...
3 // Or Calling JavaScript code
4 window.open("https://attacker.com", _top, ...
Listing 5.7: Leveraging Traditional Navigation Policies
5.3.4.2 Privileged Navigation Attack
Even when the navigation capability is disabled by iframe sandbox (which prevents the above
traditional navigation-based attack directly), it is still possible for untrusted iframes/popups to
launch privilege escalation attacks and obtain the ability of performing navigation attacks. This is
mainly caused by the inconsistencies between the WebView programming features and web regular
navigation actions. When web popup creation code (e.g., <a> and window.open()) is executed in a
sub-frame, Android always tries to select a WUI to show the popup content. Note that the WUI
selection always occurs, even when popup-creation is disabled in the mobile layer (e.g., the setting
SupportMultipleWindows is false). However, when popup-creation is not allowed, there is not a new
WUI for rendering. Instead, Android selects current WUI for showing the popup content, which
means the main frame is navigated to the popup. Thus, phishing attacks may occur.
In practice, the privileged navigation attack can be easily launched by using the exploit code
shown in Listing 5.4. Note that this code is also used for launching the WUI overlap attack. As
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shown in Table 5.1 (the fourth column), when popup-creation is disabled (by default), the code may
launch the navigation attack. Otherwise, the WUI redressing attack may be available.
5.3.5 Advantages of DCV Attacks
Compared to existing Android attacks (such as Trojan attacks [30]), DCV attacks do not
require declaring permissions, or carrying payload. Compared to other WebView-based attacks
(e.g., [9, 28, 31, 32]), which require JavaScript or JavaScript-bridges to be enabled, DCV attacks do
not have these requirements and limitations. More importantly, DCV attacks are more powerful
that attackers may obtain abilities to not only access web-mobile bridges, but also directly leverage
critical web features.
Furthermore, different from existing MITM attacks on a sub-frame inside WebView, DCV
attacks cannot be prevented by existing web protections (e.g., SOP). Unlike existing touch hijacking
in WebView [62], DCV attacks do not need to control the native code, and craft the placement of
multiple WebView components in Activity layout XML.
In addition, DCV can be leveraged to boost other attacks. For example, event-oriented attacks
[44] rely on triggering WebView event handlers, but it is difficult to trigger several critical event
handlers (e.g., onPageStarted() and onPageFinished()). This problem can be well solved through
exploiting DCV, such as the privileged navigation attack (Section 5.3.4.2).
5.3.6 Root Causes of DCV
DCV is rooted in the inconsistencies between WebView and regular browsers in terms of UI and
programming features (5.3.1). We demonstrate several critical and frequently used web features
and behaviors are harmless and safe in the context of regular browsers, but they become risky in the
context of WebView. In addition, the design of the event handler features is also flawed. In theory,
through event handlers, developers have chances to reject DCV attacks. However, unfortunately, the
design flaws of event handlers make it extremely difficult to achieve the goal.
For example, when the WUI overlap attack is performed, the event handler ‘‘onCreateWindow(
view,isDialog,isUserGesture,resultMsg)’’ is always triggered. If the event handler could deny the
creation of an untrusted WUI, attackers would fail to launch the WUI redressing attack. However,
this is very difficult because the event handler onCreateWindow() does not provide the victim app
any origin information about who is creating a popup and what content is being loaded in the popup.
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analysis tools (e.g., [44]) have high false negatives, as it is very difficult to trigger a WebView
instance at runtime. For example, as shown in Figure 5.4, to trigger WebView inside the Facebook
Messenger app, the analysis tools need to automatically log in and open a URL link.
We propose a novel static detection tool, DCV-Hunter, that utilizes program analysis to au-
tomatically vet apps. As shown in Figure 5.8, DCV-Hunter’s approach is four-fold. Given an
app, DCV-Hunter first generates its complete call graph (CG). Next, DCV-Hunter leverages CG
to reconstruct the context of each WebView instance. Then, DCV-Hunter verifies if untrusted
sub-frames exists. Finally, DCV-Hunter determines if the given app is potentially vulnerable or not.
5.4.1 Complete Call Graph Construction
We build DCV-Hunter on top of FlowDroid [63]. The original FlowDroid is not suitable for
analyzing WebView related function invocations to generate accurate call graphs because of the
missing of type information and semantics related to WebView. To mitigate this issue, we proposed
an app-level online-patching approach so that when all native code is translated to intermediate
representatives, DCV-Hunter patches all instructions “I” that contain WebView initialization
methods (e.g., “findViewById()”) by providing corresponding type information.
5.4.2 WebView Context Reconstruction
In this phase, DCV-Hunter first identifies all WebView instances from CG. Then, DCV-Hunter
separately reconstructs each WebView instance’s own context, which includes 1) the URL or HTML
code to be loaded; 2) settings (e.g., the enablement of popup creation); 3) implementation of
event handlers (e.g., “onCreateWindow()” and “onCloseWindow()”). To reconstruct the WebView
context, points-to analysis is applied [2]. For example, when an event handler class that contains the
implementation of event handlers is configured through the API “setWebChromeClient(...)”, DCV-
Hunter can check the points-to information of the API’s parameter, and retrieve the parameter’s
actual class name.
However, points-to analysis does not scale well, especially when the target app is complex. To
mitigate the problem, we also apply the data flow tracking technique [64] as a complement. For
example, when an event handler class is instantiated, the corresponding instance is treated as source.
Then, the event handler configuration APIs (e.g., “setWebChromeClient(...)”) are treated as sink.
Finally, if there is a flow between above source and sink, the event handler class should be a part of
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the context of the corresponding WebView instance.
In addition to an event handler class, several context-related objects (e.g., URL strings, WebView
settings) can also be analyzed using data flow tracking. These objects and their corresponding
APIs are treated as source and sink, respectively. More details are shown in Table 5.2. Note that
different from WebView settings and event handlers, which are often class instances, the URL
source may have several different formats, such as 1) HTML code or URL string; 2) Intent messages
(inter-component communication in Android). Both formats are often used in real-world apps. For
example, as shown in Figure 5.4, in Facebook Messenger, when a link is clicked, an Intent message
that includes the link is sent out to an activity (Andrioid UI) to start WebView and show that link.
Table 5.2: Source and Sink APIs
Source Sink
URLs WebView content loading APIs
Settings WebView Setting APIs
Event Handlers
setWebViewClient()
setWebChromeClient()
WebView
WebView content loading APIs
WebView Setting config APIs
Event handler registration APIs
5.4.3 Untrusted Iframe/Popup Detection
In this phase, given aWebView instance, DCV-Hunter checks whether an untrusted iframe/popup
is included in its loaded content. To achieve the goal, DCV-Hunter first extracts the URLs of the
untrusted iframe/popup, and then examine the event handler “shouldOverrideUrlLoading()” through
path constraint analysis to determine whether extracted URLs are approved.
5.4.3.1 Untrusted URL Extraction
Given a WebView instance, the web content loaded in WebView is analyzed based on its formats:
• HTML code: This format is usually used by the content loading APIs “loadData()” and “load-
DataWithBaseURL()” (for origin-hiding attacks). Based on the patterns of iframes/popups
(Section 2.4), all internal associated links can be extracted and then checked. On the one hand, if
a link is unsafe, such as using HTTP, code injection surface should exist, and the link is untrusted.
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On the other hand, if a link uses HTTPS, it is difficult to determine if the link is third-party,
considering the main frame does not have an explicit domain (i.e., the “null” origin).
To mitigate the problem (i.e., determine the first-party URLs), we leverage several heuristics: 1)
inside the target app, WebView class name and its internal package names are usually related
with developers’ website. Hence, we reverse them as first-party URLs. Please also note that the
reversed class and package names should not be related to third-party URLs (e.g., [65]). 2) We
also check the app information that is provided by developers in Google Play. This information
includes the links of developers’ home page, email and “privacy policy”. Finally, these links are
also treated as first-party URLs, since they are likely trusted by developers.
• URL links: DCV-Hunter handles URL links, based on their formats. If a URL is a network link,
we build a crawler based on Selenium [66] to automatically collect the webpages (the mobile
version) that can be navigated to from the URL within three depth levels. For each collected web
page, its sub-frame is checked based on our threat model (Section 5.2).
If URL is a local file link (e.g., “file://...”), DCV-Hunter first dumps the corresponding local file
from the target app, and then handles it like above regular HTML code. This is mainly because
the file scheme link is similar with the null origin and does not provide any first-party domain
information.
• Intent: Our empirical study on a set of popular hybrid apps shows that the values of the links saved
in an intent message may be arbitrary. Hence, to avoid potential false negatives, DCV-Hunter
assumes that this format of web content contains untrusted iframes/popups.
5.4.3.2 URL Approval Analysis
To determine whether an extracted untrusted URL is approved by the event handler “shouldOver-
rideUrlLoading()” or not, we perform a path-sensitive constraint analysis on the event handler code.
The key observation behind the idea is that based on the specification of the event handler [67],
when untrusted iframes/popups are opened or created, the event handler is triggered, and should
return false (Note that returning true is usually used for denying the link or other purposes [44]).
Hence, our solution is that we construct the conditions (constraints over strings) of the paths to
“returning false”, and check whether the extracted URL can satisfy the conditions. More specifically,
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based on the CG and control-flow graph of the event handler, we first find all the possible paths to
the key instruction “returning false”. Then, starting from each key instruction, we perform a fast
backward slicing along each path to construct the path constraints. The unknown variables in the
constraints are all over the string parameters (i.e., URL or request) of “shouldOverrideUrlLoading()”.
After that, based on our threat model and the content of extracted URLs, we add more constraints to
the collected constraints, including
1) <parameter>.scheme == "HTTP"
or 2) <extracted_URL>.domain == <parameter>.domain.
The first constraint is aimed to check if attackers can freely inject code into the sub-frame
through MITM attacks. The second constraint is used to verify if the domain of the extracted URL is
approved. Finally, we use an SMT solver (i.e., z3 [68]) to solve all constraints. If path constraints can
be satisfied, it indicates that the extracted URL should be approved. Please note that to implement
the solution, we also model several frequently used Java classes (e.g., WebResourceRequest, URL,
and String) to support the related operations.
5.4.4 Vulnerability Analysis
To determine each vulnerability, DCV-Hunter checks its conditions respectively (shown in the
fourth column in Table 5.1).
• Origin-hiding: DCV-Hunter first verifies whether the origin of the main frame is “null”. This
is done by checking the corresponding WebView content loading APIs and their associated
parameters. Then, for convenience, the valuable attack targets are also checked, such as web
messaging or web-mobile bridges.
• WUI redressing: DCV-Hunter first verifies WebView’s settings and event handlers to check
whether WUI creation and closure are enabled. Then, DCV-Hunter checks whether the corre-
sponding event handlers onCreateWindow() or onCloseWindow() are vulnerable or not. This is
done by checking the existence of the sensitive APIs listed in Table 5.3. Based on the analysis of
the design flaws of these event handlers (Section 5.3.6), which have to blindly approve or deny all
requests, these simple checks can obtain high accuracy.
• Main-frame navigation: For the traditional navigation based problem, iframe sandbox is checked.
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Table 5.3: APIs for the Analysis of WUI Redressing Problems
Attacks Sensitive APIs
Overlap ViewGroup.addView()
Closure
ViewGroup.RemoveView()
WebView.setVisibility()
...
If iframe sandbox is used, DCV-Hunter then verifies if the navigation capability is disabled. For
the privileged navigation attack, DCV-Hunter checks whether multiple window mode is disabled,
which is done by directly checking associated settings.
5.5 Security Impact Assessment
To assess DCV’s security impacts on real-world popular apps, we collected 17K most popular
free apps from Google Play. They are gathered from 32 categories, and each category contains 540
most popular apps. By applying DCV-Hunter on these collected apps, we found that 11,341 apps
contained at least one path from their entry points to WebView content loading APIs. Among them,
3,448 apps (30.4%) were potentially vulnerable, including 9,770 potentially vulnerable WebView
instances and 18,459 potential vulnerabilities (Table 5.4). This indicates DCV widely impact
real-world apps.
We evaluated the accuracy of DCV-Hunter by measuring its false positives. We randomly
selected 400 apps from all the apps flagged as “potentially vulnerable” by DCV-Hunter, and
manually checked them (see more details in Section 5.5.1). We find that 6 of them (1.5%) are false
positives. Our further inspection revealed that in four of these apps, during the reconstruction of
the URL loaded by WebView (Section 5.4.2), some unrelated URLs were accounted, due to the
imprecise taint analysis (i.e., overtaint). For the remaining two apps, “URL Approval Analysis”
(Section 5.4.3.2) on untrusted iframe/popup links faced difficulty in handling constraints that
contained string regular expressions. We leave addressing these weaknesses as our future work.
All experiments were run on a high-performance computer. We ran DCV-Hunter with 100
processes in parallel and each process was assigned with two computing cores and 16GB memory.
Our time cost showed that each process needed 74 seconds for each app. Thus, the total average
time cost was 0.74 second, which indicated DCV-Hunter was fast and scalable.
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Table 5.4: Potential Vulnerability Details
Potential
Attacks
Impacted
WebView
Impacted
Apps
Downloads
Origin-Hiding 324 264 2.3 Billion
WUI Overlap 1,619 408 6.1 Billion
WUI Closure 639 95 0.3 Billion
Traditional Navigation 9,769 3,447 23 Billion
Privileged Navigation 6,108 2,369 16.5 Billion
Total 9,770 3,448 23 Billion
5.5.1 Manual Verification
To manually verify target apps, we firstly modify Android source code (version 6) to let it print
necessary WebView related information. Next, we install the modified Android in a real device
(Nexus 5). Then, we test target apps. For each app, when internal WebView instances are started,
we inject attack code to target iframes/popups. Last, based on the web content shown in WebView
and the logs printed by Android, we determine if the attack code works and the app is vulnerable.
Please note that different from prior work, we do not use proxy for code injection. We find
proxy has several shortcomings (e.g., hardly locating target iframes/popups, and easily causing
HTML/JavaScript errors). Instead, we leverage Chrome’s USB debug interfaces. Since we run
test in a real device, we connect the device with PC using USB. Then, we open Chrome in PC to
inject code to target WebView instances. For example, we select a WebView instance and then open
console (in Chrome) to run extra attack code for code injection. But please always keep in mind that
before executing any code, we must select a (target) sub-frame as the code execution environment
in console.
5.5.2 Findings
Based on our assessment results, we get several interesting findings:
• Many high-profile apps are impacted by DCV: DCV widely exist in hybrid apps. Up to now,
the potentially vulnerable apps have been downloaded more than 23 billion times (the fourth
column of Table 5.4). Furthermore, these also include many manually verified popular apps
(some examples are shown in Table 5.5) such as Facebook, Instagram, Facebook Messenger,
Google News, Skype, Uber, Yelp, U.S. Bank.
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Table 5.5: Summary of Example (Manually Verified) Vulnerable Apps/Libs
(* can be any domain, while OH, WO, WC, TN, PN, and BA respectively mean Origin-Hiding,
WUI Overlap, WUI Closure, Traditional Navigation, Privileged Navigation, and Blended attacks.)
Apps/Libs
Possible Attack Scenarios Vulnerabilities
Downloads
Main-Frame Untrusted Sub-frame OH WO WC TN PN BA
Facebook * * ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 Billion+
Instagram * * ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 Billion+
Facebook Messenger * * ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 Billion+
Kakao Talk * * ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 Billion+
Google News * * ✓ ✓ 1 Billion+
Skype * * ✓ ✓ 1 Billion+
WeChat * * ✓ ✓ 100 Million+
Yelp * * ✓ ✓ 10 Million+
Kayak * * ✓ ✓ 10 Million+
Uber uber.com third-party tracking ✓ ✓ 100 Million+
ESPN espn.com third-party tracking ✓ ✓ 10 Million+
McDonald’s mcdonalds.com third-party tracking ✓ ✓ 10 Million+
Samsung Mobile Print * * ✓ ✓ 5 Million+
lastpass * * ✓ 5 Million+
dashlane * * ✓ ✓ 1 Million+
1password * * ✓ ✓ 1 Million+
U.S. bank * * ✓ ✓ 1 Million+
Huntington bank huntington.com third-party tracking ✓ ✓ 1 Million+
Chime mobile bank * * ✓ ✓ 1 Million+
Facebook Mobile Browser Lib * * ✓ ✓ ✓
Facebook React Native Lib * * ✓ ✓
• Almost all categories of apps are affected: Figure 5.9 shows the related distribution data. The
green line and the bars respectively represent the distribution of potentially vulnerable apps
and each potential vulnerability in each category. Almost all categories of apps are impacted,
including several sensitive categories (e.g., password management and banking apps). This
indicates DCV are common.
We observe that some categories are more subject to DCV attacks than others, such as news,
weather, dating, and events. We manually analyze a set of apps in these categories, and find
that these categories of apps use WebView more often to load third-party untrusted content in
iframes/popups. For example, the Google News app (one billion+ downloads) provides the news
collections to users. It allows any website to be loaded in its WebView. We manually check
several news links and find that it is common for these news web pages to embed third-party
content, especially ads and tracking services.
We also find that in some apps, their loaded web pages are safe, and do not include any untrusted
content. However, after the web pages are fully loaded, these apps run extra JavaScript code
95
Figure 5.9: Distribution of Potentially Vulnerable Apps and Potential Vulnerabilities
through the API “WebView.evaluateJavascript()” to created and embedded new iframes/popups
for loading ads content, which introduces security risks.
Furthermore, we find that the events and news apps are more likely to suffer from WUI redressing
attacks. This is mainly because these apps tend to manage WUIs by themselves. For example, in
some news apps, when a user scrolls down to the bottom of the web page, the apps will directly
append and show more content, without letting the user click a “next page” button. When the
user clicks a concrete news link, a new WUI is created and placed in the front of current WUI
to show that link. When the user finishes that web page, developers can close current WUI and
show previous WUI. In this way, the state of previous WUI is not changed, and the dynamically
appended content is also kept. This rendering strategy improves user experience. However, as
described in Section 5.3.6, due to the design flaws of the event handler system, such a WUI
management strategy is also exposed to untrusted iframes/popups, and cause security issues.
• Traditional and privileged navigation attacks impact more apps than other DCV attacks: As
summarized in the second and third columns of Table 5.4, navigation based attacks are more
popular than the other vulnerabilities. It is mainly because the security assumptions of these two
attacks are more easily satisfied. For example, many WebView instances prefer using the default
configuration (e.g., disabling popup-creation), and suffer from privileged navigation attacks.
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performing phishing attacks by leveraging the WUI overlap issue (Figure 5.11-d).
In addition, similar with the Skype app, the Kayak app also provides a title bar to reduce the UI
inconsistencies. However, this is limited to defend against DCV attacks, since the opened fake web
pages often have the same title content.
5.5.4 Security Impacts of Home-Brewed URL Address Bars
Our study shows that some hybrid apps implement their own URL address and title bars (such
as those in our case studies), which could reduce the UI inconsistencies between WebView and
regular browsers. To better evaluate the security impacts, we conducted an empirical study of 100
apps that contain home-brewed address bars. These apps are collected by filtering the DCV-Hunter
analysis results (by checking if there is a path or flow from WebView’s real-time URLs such as
the API “WebView.getUrl()” and the second parameter of the event handler “onPageFinished(view,
url)”, to UI components’ updating APIs such as “TextView.setText()”).
We find that the home-brewed address bars are ineffective to prevent DCV attacks, for two main
reasons: limited address bar lengths, and implementation errors:
• Limited Address Bar Lengths: In our study, we find that typical address bars averagely show 29
letters. When domains, including sub-domains, being accessed exceed that length, security risks
could be caused, even when some existing solutions such as showing the rightmost/leftmost of
origin/URL are in use.
• Implementation Errors: Some apps/libs, such as "Facebook Mobile Browser", use very small
fonts to show origins (Figure 5.4). This mitigates the above length limitation problem. As Figure
5.4-c shows, this address bar can effectively mitigate a DCV attack, such as the WUI overlap
attack, since the address bar can show the origin of the fake web page in real time. However,
it also has several flaws. First, due to the small font, it faces the pixel problem. Attackers may
build a fake and confusing URL by replacing few letters of the benign URL with confusing letters
(such as the letter “O”→ the number “0”). The fake URL may still spoof users.
Moreover, in these apps, our analysis finds a race condition flaw, which can be utilized to show
fake web content in WebView, while still presenting the benign URL (e.g., ebay.com) in the
address bar (Figure 5.4-d). This issue is rooted in the design flaw that several WUIs share only one
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address bar, while all these WUIs have abilities to update the content of the address bar. Hence,
attackers can still perform phishing attacks by combining a couple of DCV attacks. For example,
in the Facebook Mobile Browser lib, which suffers from the WUI overlap attack, attackers may
open a WUI to load fake content, and then immediately update the overlapped benign WUI in
background. As a result, the address bar only show attackers’ URL in a very short time and is
quickly updated to display the benign URL. In our test, we find sometimes the bad URL may not
even appear (see our online demo [50]). This indicates the blended attack is stealthy. In practice,
the blended attack can be easily launched by using the code shown in Listing 5.8.
1 // Opening a fake web page (WUI overlap attack)
2 window.open("https://attacker.com", "_blank")
3 // Refreshing the address bar (Traditional navigation attack)
4 window.open("https://eaby.com", "_top")
Listing 5.8: Exploit Code of BlendedAttacks
5.6 Vulnerability Mitigation
5.6.1 Mitigation Solution
To mitigate DCV attacks, we propose a multi-level solution that enhances the security of
WebView. First, we enhance the security of event handlers by addressing their design flaws (Section
5.3.6). For example, in onCreateWindow(), necessary information is provided, including the operator
origin who is creating a popup, and the URL the created popup is going to load. Thus, based on the
provided information, developers can reject an unauthorized request. To ease the deployment of our
solution, we also provide security enforcement. If developers provide the first-party URL list in a
configuration file inside their apps (located in the app folder “assets”), the untrusted requests can be
denied at default.
Second, we also mitigate the UI inconsistencies by providing floating URL indicators. For
example, when the main frame is navigated to a different domain by an iframe/popup, the URL
indicator can also provide users an alert. Furthermore, when users longly press a WebView instance,
the origin of the main frame being loaded by the WebView instance is presented.
Note this URL indicator is locally bound with a WUI, which is helpful to avoid the race
condition flaw (Section 5.5.4). When there are multiple WUIs available, only the foremost WUI’s
URL indicator is visible.
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Third, to mitigate origin-hiding attacks, in critical operations (e.g., accessing web-mobile
bridges), we replace the “null” origin with the origin who creates the “null” origin. This makes
existing defense solutions effective again, since they can enforce security checks or policies on the
new origins.
Fourth, to counter the WebView UI redressing problem, changes of the WUI rendering order
are monitored. When a change is performed by an iframe/popup, an alert is offered. Last, to limit
the navigation based attacks, we introduce same origin restrictions into navigation, and also fix the
conflict.
5.6.2 Mitigation Evaluation
In our evaluation, we first test the usability of our defense solution, especially about how easy to
deploy and apply our solution in practice. To do that, we select 10 real-world vulnerable apps for
testing. We find our solution can simply work, if developers involve our own WebView header files,
including the declarations of new function prototypes (e.g., onCreateWindow()), and also provide
the configuration file with the list of third-party domains. Please note that because these real apps
lack source code, we repackage them to involve necessary files.
Next, we verify the correctness of our mitigation solution by testing above ten apps. We test
them in stock (vulnerable) WebView and the WebView that implements our mitigation solution,
respectively. We find that 1) there are no errors introduced by our mitigation solution. Apps work
well as usual; 2) DCV attacks are mitigated.
Then, we measure the overhead to check if our mitigation solution impacts user experience. We
create a vulnerable app for testing. In the app, we call the WebView API loadUrl() to run associate
HTML/JavaScript code to trigger all vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, all time costs are recorded.
Similarly, we run the app in stock (vulnerable) WebView and the WebView that implements our
mitigation solution. By comparing time costs, we find our mitigation solution only introduces tiny
overhead: 2ms on average.
Last, considering the Android version fragmentation issue, we also test the compatibility of
our mitigation solution by installing our own WebView lib and running above the created app
in major Android versions. The result shows our solution is available in many major popular
Android versions (5.0+), and covers 89.3% of Android devices in use (based on the Android version
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distribution data of May 2019 [69]).
5.7 Discussion
5.7.1 Research scope
In this work, we mainly focus on Android, which is currently the most popular mobile OS.
However, there are also other WebView formats in other platforms (e.g., WKWebView for iOS).
The research on other platforms would be good complementary to our work, and we leave this as
our future work.
5.7.2 False negatives
Like any static analysis based approach, our DCV-Hunter inevitably has false negatives in some
situations. For example, in mobile apps, some URLs loaded in WebView are encrypted, some
WebView related code is dynamically loaded, and some URL related data goes through implicit
flows. We leave the improvement of our tool to reduce false negatives as our future work.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, we study iframe/popup behaviors in the context of WebView. Different from
regular browsers, WebView enables unique UI and programming features that can heavily impact
iframe/popup behaviors and break the integrity of existing defense solutions. We demonstrate
remote attackers can utilize (trigger) iframe/popup related behaviors to obtain unexpected and
dangerous privileges. To detect and mitigate the security issues, we present novel vulnerability
detection and mitigation solutions.
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6. RELATED WORK
6.1 Android WebView Security
Recently, WebView security has attracted significant attention from researchers. Luo et al. [28]
explored the potential attack vectors in WebView. Mutchler et al. [2] conducted a systematic study
on a large number of hybrid apps. Wang et al. [14] studied the Intent abuse problem in hybrid
apps. Georgiev et al. [9] conducted a systematic study on web-mobile bridges. Tuncay et al. [10]
demonstrated the potential attacks on web-mobile bridges. Jin et al. [32] disclosed new attack
channels for code injection attacks in WebView. Wu et al. [70] studied file:// based attacks. Rastogi
et al. [24] discovered web-mobile bridges might be exploited by malicious content. Li et al. [71]
disclosed a novel cross-app infection attack on WebView.
Several static analysis based approaches [13,38] were proposed to vet hybrid apps. For example,
Chin et al. [26] statically analyzed WebView vulnerabilities that result in illegal authorization and
file-based attacks. Yang et al. [13] and Hassanshahi et al. [38] proposed static analysis tools to
vet hybrid apps armed with web-mobile bridges. However, they were limited to analyze all the
vulnerabilities discussed in this dissertation.
6.2 WebView Related Defenses
Several defense approaches, such as NoFrak [9], MobileIFC [15], and Draco [10], are pro-
posed to extend SOP to local resources, or provide access control on event handlers in the native
layer. Other defense approaches, such as WIREframe [16] and HybridGuard [17], provided policy
enforcement in WebView to protect app-web bridges. However, all of them were not suitable to
prevent the attacks proposed in this dissertation. For example, there are difficulties in applying
existing approaches to prevent the EOE attacks. First, Draco requires the root permission to replace
WebView’s internal native library, and MobileIFC and NoFrak also require the recompilation of
hybrid apps with their own customized hybrid frameworks. Second, they are implemented by
instrumenting WebView or third-party hybrid frameworks. Hence, they may have to keep doing
extra more work in porting their systems into newest versions. Third, the defense level totally
depends on how well the security policies are written by developers. Finally, they performed access
control based on the web frame’s origin information.
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In addition, many solutions [48, 49] are also designed to mitigate the Android UI deception
problems [45–47]. However, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, they cannot monitor the state change of
WebView UI, and circumscribed to prevent WUI redressing attacks.
6.3 Event Handler Security
Luo et al. [28] discussed that event handlers may be used by malware to hijack and sniff web
events. However, compared with EOE, this type of attacks is more difficult to launch, because
adversaries have to control the native code in user devices, such as registering their own native event
handlers in WebView. Chen et al. [72] and Mutchler et al. [2] discovered the event handler feature
may cause sensitive data leakage (such as the authentication URL) in Oauth. Georgiev et al. [9]
and Tuncay et al. [10] discussed the possibilities that adversaries may leverage the event handler
feature to access native code. In contrast, we systematically study all types of feasible web event
oriented attacks, including the attacks that are carried out by leveraging both one single web event
and stitching multiple web events together to influence the program state.
Compared with existing attacks on WebView, EOE is more feasible and practical. Chin et
al. [26] analyzed WebView vulnerabilities that result in excess authorization and file-based cross-
zone scripting attacks. Wu et al. [70] discussed file leakage problems caused by file:// and content://
schemes in webview. However, these two kinds of attacks are limited in the Android new versions,
which provide better protections on directly accessing local files.
6.4 Symbolic Execution
In past years, symbolic execution has made big progress. Several static approaches (such
as Intellidroid [73] and TriggerScope [74]) were proposed to vet Android apps using symbolic
execution. However, these static approaches may have both higher false positives and negatives
in the context faced in this paper. First, static analysis has to address points-to and alias problems.
Second, due to the lack of real data, it is challenging to resolve Java Reflection and Intent. Finally,
it is difficult to address the array indexing type implicit flows. In real world, this type of implicit
flows is frequently used in popular apps and ad libs, such as Google Ads.
Many dynamic approaches were also implemented based on symbolic execution. For example,
DART [75] and CUTE [76] applied concolic execution to automatically test software. EXE [77]
and KLEE [78] used symbolic execution to find bugs. IntScope [79] employed symbolic execution
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to detect integer overflow problems. SAGE [80] was designed for Windows to apply symbolic
execution to vet the operating system. S2E [81] proposed the selective symbolic execution to
improve the performance. Driller [82] used selective symbolic execution to guide fuzzing, and the
result showed the combination was very effective. Existing dynamic approaches may have low
false positives. However, it is challenging for them to generate the event sequences required for
triggering a found vulnerability.
Several symbolic execution based approaches were also designed to handle implicit flows. For
instance, DTA++ [83] used symbolic execution to solve control flow problem (i.e., implicit flows),
while Spandex [84] implemented symbolic execution in Android to vet apps about password usage.
However, these two systems fall short of handling Android specifications (such as Android Intent)
and array indexing type implicit flows.
6.5 Iframe/Popup Security
In web apps, iframes/popups are often the cause of security issues, such as frame hijacking [3],
clickjacking [4], and double-click clickjacking [5]. In past years, in the context of regular browsers,
iframe/popup behaviors and these security issues were well studied. Many defense solutions were
proposed. For example, the HTTP header “X-Frame-Options” and the frame busting [4] solution
can prevent being framed. In this work, we mainly focus on the exploration of the abilities of
untrusted iframes/popups. As shown in Section 5.3, existing solutions are circumscribed to prevent
DCV attacks.
6.6 postMessage Security
In past years, several detection and defense solutions for regular postMessage were proposed.
However, all of them are incompetent to detect or defend against OSV. Barth et al. [3] conducted a
systematic study of the frame isolation and communication, and enhanced postMessage. However,
it could not prevent postMessage from being misused, and also did not support hybrid postMessage.
Saxena et al. [18] highlighted the client-side validation vulnerability (CSV) in postMessage and
proposed the detection tool “FLAX”. Weissbacher et al. [20] applied the dynamic invariant detection
technique in defending against CSV. Son et al. [19] conducted a systematic study of CSV on a
large number of popular websites, and also proposed novel defense solutions to defend against CSV.
Guan et al. discovered DangerNeighbor attacks on postMessage, and designed a deployable defense
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solution. However, they were only available to vet or protect the message receivers of N→W , and
could not eliminate OSV by making up the lost origins. Furthermore, since the source origin is not
always provided due to V2, their effectiveness may be impacted.
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7. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST WEBVIEW INTEGRITY PRACTICE
As discussed in Chapter 6, WebView security attracts more and more attention. They are already
many detection and defense solutions proposed. However, unfortunately, it is still challenging for
them to discover and mitigate the security issues we present in this dissertation. There are several
reasons:
• Many popular web features and behaviors are not considered and covered: Today, the web
platform has made significant progresses. A large number of web features and behaviors
are available. However, many of them are complicated and sophisticated, which introduce
challenges to build a complete protection solution. In this dissertation, we aim to explore
sensitive web behaviors, which bring benefits to current solutions. Based on our study results,
existing solutions can be enhanced.
• Event handlers would play more important roles in the protection of WebView: As presented in
this dissertation (e.g., Section 5.3.6), many web features and behaviors can be controlled and
limited by the WebView event handler system. Although the event handler system has made
great progresses, there are still several weaknesses. In particular, many event handlers failed
to provide more detailed information for developers, such that developers can do appropriate
validation to prevent malicious behaviors. The expected information includes
– Who is triggering the web event? The information may include the origin and the frame
information (indicating if the main frame is making the action) of the actor.
– What action current event is actually making? For example, when a new popup is
created, the url being loaded by the new popup (being created) should be provided to
the event handler “onCreateWindow()”. Hence, developers can validate the url to ensure
only trusted web content can be popped up.
Moreover, based on our study, we find when WebView is integrated, there are several ways for
developers to reduce the security risks:
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• Reducing or narrowing down the attack surface: To launch attacks, remote attackers usually
need to inject untrusted code into WebView through web or network attacks. If the code
injection surface is eliminated, it is hard for remote attackers to continue attacks. Hence, it is
better for developers to carefully control the content loaded in WebView. This can be mainly
done through two event handlers:
– shouldOverrideUrlLoading(): This is helpful to control the content loaded in sub-frames.
– shouldInterceptRequest(): This is useful to limit the loading of third-party resources.
• Doing validation before providing sensitive functionalities: Some of event handlers provide
rich origin information. Developers should well utilize this information and ensure only
trusted web code can access sensitive functionalities.
• Limiting capabilities of sub-frames: As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the iframe sandbox
mechanism is an effective defense solution to limit capabilities of sub-frames. When third-
party web content is inevitably involved, the corresponding iframe sandbox should be assigned
to disable critical capabilities, such as popup-creation and main-frame navigation.
• Providing necessary UI elements: The inconsistencies between regular browsers andWebView
cause serious security issues. It is still benefited by mitigating the inconsistencies, such as
providing address bar. However, the mistakes discovered in Chapter 5.5.4 should be avoided.
• Using WebView alternatives: WebView provides rich UI and programming features. However,
for many developers, these features are not required. In this case, the WebView alternatives
can applied. These alternatives mainly include
– Regular browsers: Developers can select to open trusted content in WebView, and open
untrusted content in regular browsers. This solution can be implemented by leveraging
the event handler “shouldOverrideUrlLoading()”.
– Custom tab: This is powered by Chrome/Chromium, and safer than WebView.
• Globally disabling JavaScript: Many attacks are launched by JavaScript code. When
JavaScript is not needed, it is better to globally disable it, which can prevent many attacks.
This can be done by using WebView setting APIs.
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8. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
Nowadays, mobile app developers are enjoying the benefits of the amalgamation of web and
mobile techniques. This is achieved through the application of WebView, which can be easily
integrated to show web pages and run JavaScript code inside mobile apps. In past few years,
WebView security has made significant processes. However, the abilities of untrusted web code
in WebView are not well studied. In this dissertation, we fill the gap by conducting the systematic
security study on three web behaviors, and several serious security issues:
• Event-Oriented Exploits (EOE): We explore the possibilities of involving the event handler
features in potential real-world attacks. We further thoroughly study all web events, native
event handlers and their triggering constraints. Based on our findings, we present EOEDroid,
a novel system that can automatically detect and verify EOE vulnerabilities by generating
exploit code. We evaluate EOEDroid using a large number of apps and find several critical
vulnerabilities.
• Differential Context Vulnerabilities (DCV): Iframes/popups are often the root cause of several
critical web security issues, and have been well studied in regular browsers. However, they are
rarely understood and scrutinized in WebView, which has a totally new working environment.
We conduct the systematic study of iframe/popup behaviors, and identify several fundamental
design flaws and vulnerabilities, named differential context vulnerabilities (DCV). We find
that by exploiting DCV, an untrusted iframe/popup becomes very dangerous in Android
WebView. We have designed a novel detection technique, DCV-Hunter, to assess DCV
security impacts on real-world apps. Our measurement on a large number of popular apps
shows that DCV are prevalent. We have also presented a multi-level protection solution to
mitigate DCV, which is shown to be scalable and effective.
• Origin Stripping Vulnerability (OSV): We conduct the first systematic study on hybrid
postMessage in Android apps and identify a new type of vulnerabilities called Origin Strip-
ping Vulnerability (OSV). To measure the prevalence and presence of OSV, we design a
lightweight vulnerability detection tool, called OSV-Hunter. Our evaluation on a set of
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popular apps demonstrates that OSV is widespread in existing hybrid postMessage imple-
mentations. Guided by the evaluation results, we design three safe hybrid postMessage APIs,
called OSV-Free, to eliminate potential OSVs in hybrid apps. We show that OSV-Free meets
the development requirements: it is secure, fast, and generic.
In the future, we plan to study the following directions:
• Implementing a safer WebView. WebView enables several great unique UI and programming
features. However, its design flaws make preventing existing and newly found attacks ex-
tremely difficult. We plan to implement a newWebView with safer design and implementation
(e.g., safer event handler systems).
• Studying more critical web features and behaviors. In this dissertation, we study three
interesting web behaviors, which are safe in regular browsers and become dangerous in
WebView. Inspired by this direction, there may be more security issues on other web
behaviors. Therefore, in the future, we plan to explore more web features and behaviors (e.g.,
third-party web content), discover more security issues, and better enhance the security of
WebView.
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